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## **ON THE ABSOLUTE RATIONAL WILL**

**(SUBLATION OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY)**

### **V. Political Will - the totally practical universal Rational Will**

At this point of the everlasting development of the Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will, not only do I have to introduce the concept of Politovolia - i.e. the concept of totally practical universal Political Will, - but I also have to explain the reason why I do not use the category of politologia (political sciences), all the more, that the latter is well known. I will argue that Politovolia refers to the world of complete reality; it is the totally practical universal Political Will. Being the highest organisation of the Absolute Rational Will in the living process of its continuous self-development, it is Politovolia that develops the Political Will of each particular epoch. Political Will is the highest manifestation of the all-inclusive and omni-potent willing itself Rational Will; it is the universal power that is in everything and there is no social human activity in which Political Will does not rule itself through itself. Developing itself continually, it develops the ethical and civic virtues as well as the moral values and political culture of society in each particular epoch.

Practical Politovolia - in which all people are involved and which includes practical politics, constitutional and private law, economy, trade, religion, art, culture as well as all other fields of human activity, - constitutes the totality of political life. Being based on the complete reality of the absolute material entelechy and its rational Volition, Politovolia is the highest organisation of the latter and aims at satisfying the Rational Will of actual human beings. For this reason, Politovolia appears before the Science of Philosophy.

Politovolia elevates the principle of Absolute Rational Will "Will yourself" as the principle of today's world. It contains the principle of intellectualistic philosophy - "Cognise yourself" - as sublated; it is the totality which embraces the one-sidedness of its previous stage as sublated. In it the willing Volition sublates Thought, Will sublates Spirit, Freedom sublates Truth, in other words, Politovolia sublates philosophy. Only in virtue of its principle can we explain the world history deeper and better.

To want participation in the life of state, in political power, means to want to take possession of and possess your absolute property. The purpose of forming the Will of man is to elevate him from the state of being a political animal, which possess Reason, to the state of having a political personality with strong political Will. To possess himself as a political personality - this is the highest determination of Man; it is the richest and the deepest one to which he advances in his development. People are predestined to know and possess themselves as free ones, to have the energy to take care of their own interests, of their own purposes in a world of political Freedom. Politics is the supreme form in which the speculative Rational Will demonstrates itself because it is the definite way of its self-cognition, self-possession and self-ruling.

Aristotle expresses this idea in his own way. His great speculative ideas are definitely worth being taken into consideration: "All science and all capacity (*δυναμις*) have an end, and this is the good: the more excellent they are, the more excellent is their end; but the most excellent capacity is the political, and hence its end is also the good."<sup>(1)</sup> Aristotle says that the Good is the end of all abilities, so the end of the supreme ability is the supreme Good. But the supreme ability is the political ability and undoubtedly the end of politics is the supreme Good. This determination is magnificent in any way; it is the highest one that ancient Greece gave the world.

Aristotle says that the happiness of each separate person and the happiness of the state are identical. The best life for each person separately and for the whole state is and has to be one and the same: “Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and of the best constitution must also be the same.”<sup>(2)</sup> The supreme Good is one and the same in social as well as private life. This is a great definition. Noteworthy and great in Aristotle is that he was the first philosopher in the history of ethical Thought to put the Rational Will (the urge, the Willing) in the basis of ethics, whereas Socrates, who created the latter, made the virtues knowledge. Aristotle went further on. Hegel acknowledges that fact: “Of Ethics Aristotle recognises that it indubitably also applies to the individual, though its perfection is attained in the nation as a whole,” in politics. “Aristotle indeed appreciates so highly the state, that he starts at once (Polit. I. 2) by defining man as ‘a political animal, having reason. Hence he alone has knowledge of good and evil, of justice and injustice, and not the beast,’ for the beast does not think.”<sup>(3)</sup> The highest moment of Rational Will, the one that comprises all the other its determinations, is the political. It is unconditionally necessary for each person to take part in the political world and life - his supreme purpose, his highest interest and only when does he act in society well-organized as a political community, he has, takes possession of and uses his own spiritual-willed nature.

Let us also become acquainted with Hegel's opinion of Aristotle's ideas: “But with Aristotle, as with Plato, the state is the *prius*, the substantial, the chief, for its end is the highest in respect of the practical.”<sup>(4)</sup> Hegel cannot but express the fact that according to Aristotle the most superb is the political strength (ability) realized through the subjective activity, so that the latter has in it its determination, its essence. Thus the political is the supreme, because its purpose is supreme as far as the practical is concerned. According to Aristotle politics is the most important amongst the practical sciences: “Now politics appears to be such” a most authoritative and most architectonic science or faculty; “for it is this which regulates what sciences are needed in a state and what kind of sciences should be learned by each [kind of individuals] and to what extent. The most honoured faculties, too, e.g., strategy and economics and rhetoric are observed to come under this [faculty]. And since this faculty uses the rest of the practical sciences and also legislates what men should do and what they should abstain from doing, its end would include the ends of the other

faculties; hence this is the end which would be the good for mankind. For even if this end be the same for an individual as for the state, nevertheless the end of the state appears to be greater and more complete to attain and preserve; for though this end is dear also to a single individual, it appears to be more noble and more divine to a race of men or to a state.”(5) In his point of view ethics is politics as well, but the subject-matter of ethics is custom, the main norms of behaviour of the individual as a member of political society, not the state institutions and government at all.

Aristotle speaks about politics superbly, but it is even more superbly to develop Aristotle on the basis of Hegel's speculative method. Practical Will has not yet found its true Right in philosophy and cannot find it there; it is faced with the necessity of freeing itself from the shackles of cognising philosophy. The whole infinite wealth of the absolute Volition, which Hegel reveals to us in his philosophy only in the categories of Spirit, can be expressed incomparably better in the categories of Political Will - the totally practical universal Rational Will, - in a new science called POLITOVOLIA. The word is a compound of POLITO like in the word politologia and VOLIA from the Slavonic word *wola* (will or volition in English).

We cannot but use the category of politovolia if we I want to emphasise the volitional - the entelechial - nature of the practical thinking Will and put stress on its material actuality, not the moment of pure scientific knowledge; all the more that from the very beginning the science of politologia was insufficiently - if at all, - interwoven with speculative philosophy. No wonder that politologia, such as we know it today, is not a speculative science. But Politovolia is infinitely more than being a science only; that is the reason we do not use the term of politologia. Politovolia is as much a living self-organizing deed that takes possession of itself as a scientific system as it is a scientific system that develops and initiates itself as a living deed; it is the absolutely actual.

Unlike philosophy, which is a pure science devoid of any serious putting into practice, not only is the Science of Politovolia - i.e., the Science of Political Will, - constantly examining and developing theoretically the volitional kingdom of freedom, but it is also carrying the latter into practice, and in so doing, it is the eternal process of coming into possession of itself through rational Volitions. The moment of realizing the speculative entelechial purposes is absolutely essential; in the process of

its self-development within itself the absolute entelechy takes possession of itself and uses itself in a practical manner in the world of political Freedom, which it creates for itself. The principle of vitality, of activity, in one word, practice in general, is more important than theory and practice contains the latter in itself as sublated: the world-history is only a history of the development of Politovolia; **the coming** one after another political demands and needs in various political epochs are principles of development of both theoretical and practical Politovolia. As a universal actual demand each of these principles had to perform a great history-making deed: to become a principle of the world, to transform it, to win recognition as an universal actual principle of power, which has the supreme volitional purpose intrinsically in itself and prepares the birth of a new, higher principle. As a result of the whole preceding development of practical Politovolia the latter contains the principles of all the previous epochs as sublated.

Politovolia is the empirical proof of the fact of primacy of the practical over the theoretical. While Politovolia is the absolutely necessary, philosophy itself as a science is insufficient and unsatisfactory. People began to develop philosophy only after their material needs were satisfied. As early as its very beginning in ancient Greece philosophy got rid of material life. All ancient philosophers retired into private life dedicated to truth, knowledge and spirit and did not want to be a part of the energy of actual life. They exerted great influence on the entire further development of philosophy. Aristotle admits that philosophy is nothing else but cognition for the sake of cognition: “That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers ... since they philosophised in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake.” (The works of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, volume VIII, *Metaphysica*, second edition, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1966, p. 982b) This quotation is extremely important; it expresses the credo of all philosophers who think that the aim of philosophy is truth. The principle “Cognise yourself” started its

victorious march in ancient Greece. From the very beginning it manifests itself as withdrawal of philosophers from the material actuality of the absolute; the ancient Greek philosophers were the ones who developed the idealistic philosophical doctrine based on the principle mentioned above. Hegel's philosophy is the developed result of this principle, because he united the principles of all the philosophies, which preceded his own one; he united them as aspects of the supreme principle "Cognise yourself" and thus reduced them to moments of the Absolute Idea.

Hegel also acknowledges that Politovolia and political Freedom were the first to appear. According to him "If we say that the consciousness of freedom is connected with the appearance of Philosophy, this principle must be a fundamental one with those with whom Philosophy begins; a people having this consciousness of freedom founds its existence on that principle seeing that the laws and the whole circumstances of the people are based only on the Notion that Mind forms of itself, and in the categories which it has. Connected with this on the practical side, is the fact that actual freedom develops political freedom, and this only begins where the individual knows himself as an independent individual to be universal and real, where his significance is infinite, or where the subject has attained the consciousness of personality and thus desires to be esteemed for himself alone. Free, philosophic thought has this direct connection with practical freedom, that as the former supplies thought about the absolute, universal and real object, the latter, because it thinks itself, gives itself the character of universality." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane, in three volumes, Volume 1, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 95) Consequently, "on account of the general connection between political freedom and the freedom of Thought, Philosophy only appears in History where and in as far as free institutions are formed." (Ibid., p. 95)

For Hegel "Mind requires to separate from its natural will and engrossment in matter if it wishes to enter upon Philosophy." (Ibid., p. 95) True, for theoretical philosophy Truth is the absolute object of philosophy. However, this is not the ultimate End (Goal) of men of deed and practice - everyone is a man of deed and practice in real life. Men have absolutely practical Ends in their practical lives; they will the Good and desire their welfare for these are the Ends of objective Volition. In their practical philosophy the primacy of the practical over the theoretical is unquestionable. This practical philosophy is outside the University auditoriums, because only outside the cold walls of the Universities green and living is the tree of life. It cannot be the other

way round for the end of man's Will is action. In practical life, Rational Voluntarism - the I's will to think, - signifies usefulness or practical consequences of volitional actions as a test of truth. This use, or experience, is the true test of real existence. Rational Voluntarism sets up action and satisfaction of volitional needs, as the standard of truth. "I will" is the principle of rational Voluntarism; it sublates in itself "I think" - the principle of all rational (intellectualistic) and idealist philosophies.

Neither Hegel's philosophy nor any intellectualistic philosophy can be put into practice; the ultimate uselessness, the plight and obvious decline of academic philosophy are hardly amazing. Paradoxically enough, Hegel knew it perfectly well. Stating in the preface of his *Philosophy of Right* that philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give instruction as to what the world ought to be, he continues as follows: "As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk." Hegel expresses the substantial of the spirit of his and - it seems to me, - our epoch as well. Hegel is right: Speculative philosophy cannot do the job but practical Politovolia can and always does.

Yet, Hegel mainly deals with the Theoretical Idea. His examination of the Practical Idea, - the practical action, in which the Rational Will as a self-determining practical activity realises itself, - is insufficient. Hegel himself was not satisfied by the state of practical philosophy of his time. It had failed to gain speculative character and nobody knew it better than Hegel. Although he pays close attention to practical philosophy, which the latter entirely deserves, he cannot develop it. The very principle of his philosophy "Cognise yourself" is only a moment of the absolute material actuality and, therefore, cannot be the genuine principle of practical philosophy.

It is beyond doubt that Hegel played a great and even the greatest role in making philosophy a science, but first and foremost he was interested in Spirit as self-knowing Truth. Although he asserts that the Absolute Idea is an identity of theoretical and practical Idea, the latter is not as important as the former one since the concept is the soul of his philosophy: “The Concept is everything and its movement is the universal absolute activity, the self-determining and self-realizing movement.”<sup>(6)</sup> The theoretical Idea, the Spirit and its principle “Cognise yourself” are the foundation, the organizing moment of his philosophy; only from the point of view of this principle does he examine and develop the content of philosophy and that is the reason that according to him the Will is only a subordinated moment of Thought, of Spirit: “Thought is that which determines itself into will, of which it remains the substance. Without thought there can therefore be no will, and whereas even the crudest of persons only wills in so far as he has thought; an animal, since it does not think, is also incapable of willing.”<sup>(7)</sup> Hegel does not take into consideration the fundamental fact that without the volitional material activity, however, there is impossible to exist any thinking Will at all. Idealism and materialism have been divided in philosophy only; this non-speculative division has been the product of the philosophical understanding. Actually, in life, they are invariably united. The ordinary man is as much an idealistic materialist as he is a materialistic idealist. It is the volitional thinking Will that interweaves matter and Thought and possesses itself in their unity.

Hegel failed to discover the absolute Volition - the absolute entelechy - and its supreme principle "Will yourself"; they belong to the standpoint of our time. Hegel omitted to interweave the two aspects of the absolute material Volition (entelechy): “Cognise yourself” (Spirit, theoretical activity) and “Possess yourself” (Will, practical material actuality) in their entelechial totality, the result being that he is not speculative enough. One of his most famous thoughts deserves to be paraphrased at this point in order to show how much modern Politovolia has advanced: what is rational-willed is entelechial and what is entelechial is rational-willed. Hegel could not express this thought in much the same manner as we do above. He failed to elevate philosophy to the standpoint of absolute entelechy. The Absolute in its thinking is together with it an absolute Will; it is as much a spiritualised Will as it is a volitional Spirit. The absolute Will is the living process of realizing its rational Freedom and in each particular moment it has the latter as the result of the whole

course of its self-development up to that moment; a result, which the Rational Will invariably demonstrates in its self-organization as a state.

Being the manifestation of absolute reality, Politovolia has never accepted and cannot accept the excesses of absolute idealism. Sensation of the external world, memory, thinking, the formation of habits, and personal identity all rest upon organic features of the living body; the self is invariably embodied. Free will is both practically and personally essential to the character of human life. The political Man knows that it is not Thought that determines itself to Will; he turns away from pure speculative principles. Being the subject of the Absolute Rational Will, he is a man of deed and turns towards the concreteness and adequacy of his rational Volition, towards action and towards power. He is a rational voluntarist and politovolical empiricist. Human beings' ideas about their volitional desires in the world of material entelechy are a pure manifestation of the self-realising and omnipotent Absolute Will, which cognises itself only in order to enter into consummate possession of itself and rule itself for itself. Since times immemorial rational voluntarists - the majority of mankind, - have known that if and only if an idea can be successfully employed in human action in pursuit of human goals and interests, it agrees with the complete reality of material entelechy, and is therefore true.

Not Hegel's Absolute Truth but true Freedom is the absolutely actual since it is the unity of the Will for-itself of the absolute material entelechy and Spirit's Absolute Truth, which as the cognised itself Will is only Will in-itself. The in-and-for-itself governing itself Absolute Will sublates its above mentioned two immanent moments, contains them in their unity and, in so doing, attains to its True Freedom. The Absolute Rational Will governs the World and has its highest end – True Freedom, - as its goal and, thus, as its beginning.

In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel says: “So far as I understand law, I can find in it, among the Romans”, the Roman jurists and in Roman law by and large, “nothing either of thought, Philosophy or the Notion.”<sup>(8)</sup> As a matter of fact there is more to be found in Roman law than philosophy. It is the manifestation of pure practical Politovolia, precisely speaking, a stage in the development of politovolia, but Hegel failed to think so; he did not raise philosophy to the genuinely higher principle “Will yourself.” It was not yet the need of his time; Hegel himself

says that each philosopher is a son of his people and his time. He still did not know that the very philosophy is insufficient as a science. Politovolia is as old as philosophy; it is the supreme practical worldly-wisdom and a common deed of every person in the state, in other words, it is the developed political organization of the Rational Will. The cognition of Truth, the highest goal of philosophy, is only a moment of the actual, but the latter is infinitely more since within and through itself it cognises and takes possession of itself.

The main purpose, which we put forward in this chapter, is to show that the movement of the absolute World-Will towards politism is eternal necessity and absolute purpose of that Will, and in so doing to develop the science of Politovolia. The absolute spiritual Will - as an absolute totality, - contains personalism and politism as its speculative moments. The Will cognises and takes possession of itself in the process of its infinite coming to itself - this is the freedom of Will, its absolute and supreme purpose. Its determinations are individuality and universality. Since Will contains them in their absolute unity, each of these two moments can be understood only through the other one and together with the other one. In his really speculative philosophy Hegel expresses it superbly: “The principle of personality is universality.”<sup>(9)</sup> It is a great true definition. The individual personality is the absolute subject of the rational will, in and through which the will realizes its greatest and absolute purpose, i.e. to cognise and possess the very itself in the infinite form of truth and freedom; this alone does the rational will in world-history. Man is the infinite free entelechial subjectivity, which determines the march of world-history in the course of its own activity.

Personality - the practical, objective volitional self-possession of each person, - is the absolute subject of the ever realizing itself highest principle: “Will yourself.” As the directed toward itself absolute activity personality is the living process of organizing its scientific, industrial, trade, legal, religious and ethical activities, or in other words, its political actuality; it is the Rational Will for a well governed social life in a political, strong-willed union of the whole society, which in and through this union organizes its political Will for Freedom and Justice - its highest public Good.

Here, however, we will examine the human person in his logical – i.e. free of any historical details, - form. Everything begins with man and everything comes back into

him. He is the infinite subject of universal and supreme political rational Freedom, which personality can ever reach and possess and towards which he naturally strives for in and through society.

The Politovolia is as much a practical as a theoretical system in development. It strives to reveal its subject matter, the absolute self-moving and self-developing process of the Rational Will. **Having its inherent absolute purpose**, the latter develops and self-determines itself freely in the process of its own activity, with the result that it makes itself what it is. Hence, in order to understand the content of politovolia, it is enough to grasp the course of the Absolute Rational Will's development. In the course of the self-realizing development of its absolute principle "Will yourself", the Politovolia reveals itself to itself totally and demonstrates its whole content as a determination of the infinite thinking will, which thinks and wills only the very itself. However, the aim of this work is not to give an overall presentation of politovolia (*Politovolia* is yet to be written), but to dwell on the speculative presentation of its most important concepts - property and Freedom. In order to achieve these conceptions in their truth and right - which is the highest purpose of this work, - we will examine them in their development and realization; to save labour, we will not do it on the basis of the practical but theoretical politovolia because the united principle, which pierce the one as well as the other, makes them one and the same and in the whole they correspond with one another.

Property is the first concept of the infinite Rational Will. The politovolia necessarily begins with it. That is why it is essential to present the dialectical - i.e. through and from itself - movement of the Rational Will, as well as the speculative result of its self-development, which (result) contains in itself all the stages and the whole wealth of this development as sublated, so that all the particular principles of the preceding epochs are necessary moments of the united principle "Will yourself." At the same time not only do we want to present the concept of property through its former development, but also to develop it further on the basis of the above stated and for the first time clearly realized principle, i.e. we want to grasp this concept deeper and more concretely and thus to make the next step in revealing its infinitely rich content. We will rely on the great achievements of our predecessors in the field of practical and theoretical politovolia. On principle these achievements are common

property of all mankind, because they belong to the *free and true* thinking Will. The latter is the living process of its self-determination through which it organizes its actual political world. Having in view the purposes, which we put forth, that is, to give a brief report on politovolia, we are not so interested in the historical chronology of the development of the concept of property (which chronology is a subject of the history of politovolia) as in the logical development of this concept.

It is extremely interesting and peculiar, that in the whole development of politovolia so far, property - no matter whether it has been treated as private or common (social) one - has been perceived mainly and most of all as taking possession of and being in possession of outward things, of the material world. This is a fact that does not need special proofs; it is easy to find them in every historical epoch and in any scientific politovological work. That is why let it be perfectly enough if we quote Aristotle: "Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries."(10) and Hegel: "All things may become man's property, because man is free will and consequently is absolute, while what stands over against him lacks this quality. Thus everyone has the right to make his will the thing or to make the thing his will, or in other words to destroy the thing and transform it into his own; for the thing, as externality, has no end in itself; it is not infinite self-relation but something external to itself."(11) Hegel - like Aristotle and John Locke, - is a great apologist and an upholder of private property as an absolute moment and actuality of freedom. Determining private property in the following way: "Since my will, as the will of a person, and so as a single will, becomes objective to me in property, property acquires the character of private property,"(12) Hegel determines the free private proprietor and his inviolable will as well, namely, that the person as such has in property the reality of his freedom, "for in property the matter is posited as what it is, i. e. as something which lacks independence, and which, since it has essential significance only as the reality of a person's will, is not to be touched by anyone else."(13)

We must state unhesitatingly, that this determination of property as only outer sphere of personality's freedom is completely insufficient. Fortunately, however, the rational will - the creator of world-history - has been working and works tirelessly on

the further development of its determinations; it has a purpose and this purpose is to set itself as an absolute property, to attain the great wealth of its content, greater than which there is not possible to be. Practically, i.e. in practical politovolia, Rational Will, which invariably pursues its aim and does its hard work, has covered a long way - through many stages and moments; and long ago it went beyond the framework of the quoted above defective determination of property. But theoretical politovolia has not yet taken possession of this infinitely rich content. As if now time has come the Rational Will to cognise and possess more deeply itself, to return to itself, to attain its freedom as its own property, to posit itself as the having itself Will. But this is a point to be made now in more depth.

We shall start with Plato. Plato made the idea of communism great and superb and to a highest degree pure and noble, and owing to that, he has led many people: the Plato-like thinking Jews, Thomas More, Tomaso Campanella, Morelly, Babeuf, Fourier, Marx, Engels, Lenin; he was their great teacher. Unfortunately, neither Plato nor his followers knew whatsoever about the empty greatness of his abstract ideas. Let us, however, go into these abstractions in more details: the myth for the perfect good, for the perfect social system, for the perfection of egalitarianism, the myth for abundance. According to Plato: "That city then is best ordered [governed] in which the greatest number" of citizens "use the expression 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same things in the same way."(14) ... "Then, these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common."(15) ... "Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common?"(16) Two thousand and four hundred years later Marx echoed Plato's ideas, developing them in a remarkable way. He wrote that the communists could summarize their theory in one expression: abolishing of private property.

According to Marx-Plato's communism, the common cause that is at the root of every public evil is the domination of private property; in order a just social order to be settled it is necessary to completely reject the very institution of private property and to destroy all proprietary relations in society, so that all its members are in identical relations with the means of production as well as with the objects of

consumption. On the basis of this, nothing in society can belong personally to anybody and cannot be anybody's exclusive property, and each individual is a social one. The society becomes an enormous and united to the highest degree commune, in which everybody does what he can - in accordance with his abilities - for the social wealth and takes from it what he needs. Legislation and law are oriented towards the fact that in society all members are equal, i.e. nobody possesses anything personally - in this society and the arranged on its basis state there is no place for private persons, for free private business efforts and initiatives. Furthermore the negation of private property is also a negation of personality. Thus definitions and relations that in fact belong to the individual are made social property.

The really great, the elevated in this idea, with which the latter has been attracting the minds and the wills of countless followers for more than 2400 years, is that it is filled up with the most noble aspirations and excellent intentions. In this idea one can see the highest purposes, which the uneducated will can put itself: to secure prosperity for all and in an equal measure for all; the purpose of society is the universal happiness, i.e. equal happiness for all individuals, who are born equal in rights and needs, i.e. everybody has an equal right to use all goods; in communist society there must be neither wealth nor poverty; the education must be in the spirit of solidarity and equality, of friendship, good will and mutual aid, of justice, consent and harmony; all members of such a society have common interest in a social system without private property; an arrangement of society on the basis of the principle: "From everyone according to the abilities, to everyone according to the needs."

For three thousands years now these purposes have attracted the poor, who have invariably been in the great majority in each epoch till now. They have always demanded justice, prosperity and happiness for all - even if they have not been conscious of these principles and have not clearly formulated that will. These purposes are eternal - great and indestructible - and each following epoch will contain them with absolute necessity, will have them and inevitably must have them as a purpose, because they are moments of the purposes of the Absolute Rational Will, but at the same time, the really higher task of the politovolia is to overcome them and to achieve them in their truth and right; and the politovolia achieves them. These purposes are only moments of the Absolute Will, which at this stage has not yet

realized itself completely through them. It has only marked its beginning, and that realization is a purpose of its whole further development. Marx-Plato's doctrine is a dogmatism of the first water, because from the two opposite determinations - common and private property - it proclaims the first for completely true, and the second - for untrue; here the Will is still so immature and unreasonable that it takes the opposite determinations in their one-sidedness and division, but it is not able to interweave them and in such a way to have them in their totality, truth and right.

In this most abstract form of communism – completely deprived of personalism (of the principle of personality, of subjectivity) and thus perfectly untrue and rightless as far as the individuals are concerned - man acts not for his own purposes and interests, which are close to his heart and fill up his soul, his aspirations, desires, longings, Will, but he has to subdue, to obey society, strictly speaking, to obey the rulers of this society; a society that can exist in this kind only thanks to a strictest, a most severe, oppressing man's freedom regulation by the rulers. The individual is required to have only universal consciousness in a unity with the laws, with the universal end of the state, so that each separate subject has the spirit and the will of the political community as his absolute end, as his second spiritual-willed nature; he is supposed to want, act, live and enjoy only insofar as he is the living actualisation of the Rational Will of his political community. Here the individual passions and interests of man are forgotten, they are not taken into consideration. But they are important in the extreme; they are the determinate way in which the absolute entelechy manifests itself. Hegel expresses this idea in his own way: “Impulse and passion constitute nothing other than the liveliness of the subject however, in accordance with which it is itself involved in its purpose and in the carrying out of the same. What is ethical concerns the content, which as such is the universal, an inactive factor deriving its motivation from the subject. This motivation constitutes interest in that it is immanent within the content, and passion in that it involves the whole of active subjectivity.”<sup>(17)</sup> In passion the absolute purposes are revealed; purposes that activate man, that are his own purposes and that are the source of his will's energy to act for himself, for his own interests, to cognise, to have and insatiably, unabatedly to enjoy the infinite sphere of the subjective, personal freedom - the true and the great in man.

But Marx-Plato's form of communism does not acknowledge this absolute, unconditional, infinite motivation of the subject at all; and what is more, Marx-Plato's form fully eliminates the principle of subjective freedom, which is the principle of vitality, of mobility and pays a high price for that, remaining only a lifeless, non-effective, empty and hollow, and perfectly abstract form, like for example a blooming cut off tree, planted in dry sand: a dead tree. Here is not given a full range for contribution and manifestation of the infinite energy of the Will for development, Freedom; individuality is wanted to have only common purposes, to act in the name of the society, for the society and only in this round-about way for itself. Individuality must be entirely a social unit and in such a way, it is here only in possibility, in itself, but not an actually in-and-for-itself having itself universal individuality.

However, the universal purposes and laws in the life of the society - for which I am required to be in unity with, - must be brought to the trial of my thinking and willing itself Rational Will. I (everyone is "I", a person) want to examine whether I find in them myself, my subjectivity and individuality, my Will and my thought; it is absolutely necessary: to be acknowledged the absolute right of the "I" to have freedom, to have it at his disposal. I want to examine whether this universal thought and Will is my thought and Will and whether I am at home with myself in them, in other words, whether I am free.

But in Marx-Plato's doctrine there is apparent the highest dependence of the individual on society; the subject is not acknowledged as a personality. Being abstract, this allegedly most just communism, inevitably comes into its highest opposite; it is the most unjust towards man. All the limitations and prohibitions, imposed by it, aim at destroying the most human in man: the aspiration towards the individual, the absolutely unabated desire to compete with his likes. These philosophers, whose thinking is still abstract and one-sided, want to deprive man of freedom of action, of his supreme right of free competition, although it is just a condition sine qua non for the full and undisturbed development of the human person, and furthermore a condition for the development of society, of mankind in general, of the "I" as such.

Hegel's speculative comment upon Plato's idea of property deserves to be quoted in full: "Personal property is a possession which belongs to me as a certain person, and in which my person as such comes into existence, into reality: on this ground Plato excludes it. It remains, however, unexplained how in the development of industries, if there is no hope of acquiring private property, there can be any incentive to activity; for on my being a person of energy very much depends my capacity for holding property. That an end would be put to all strife and dissensions and hatred and avarice by the abolition of private property, as Plato thinks, may very well be imagined in a general way; but that is only a subordinate result in comparison with the higher and reasonable principle of the right of property: any liberty has actual existence only in so far as property falls to the share of the person. In this way we see subjective freedom consciously removed by Plato himself from his state."(18) At this level, which as a matter of fact also contains some positive moments, but in the general and in the whole remains abstract, up to which Plato and later Marx raised the theoretical politovolia, man is required to humble, to submit himself entirely to society, which in itself is an abstract subject, if it gives no field for manifestation of the absolute, the infinite, the true subject, the person.

Here, within the framework of this doctrine the Will is still completely unreasonable; it has not yet risen above consciousness for the common. Here the individuals, the subjects cannot develop freely through and for themselves; they are only common people and only in possibility, in themselves, they are free as consciousness and Will, but not in actuality, for themselves. The common property, the common, claimed to be mine, is not my own activity. My poor activity is not yet the highest degree of absolute activity, which in general is an activity only as an activity of the individual; it is the individuality that puts in action. A substance of the person is energy; his property is unthinkable without the activity of his spiritual Will. The latter has itself only as far as it acts freely, but in Plato-Marx's form of communism, the Rational Will is refused and forbidden its supreme right: the right to possess, master and use its total property, its freedom. Here the right of the individuality, of the individual to be the owner of his spirit and Will is not acknowledged.

The principle of common property is also a principle of rejection of personal freedom. It rejects completely freedom and creates people with slavery psyche, i.e. it is a principle of blind, slavish, passive, oppressing the subjective freedom obedience, on the basis of which only political enslavement and dictatorship are possible. Detailed and pedantic regulation of absolutely everything by the rulers paralyses the initiative, kills the creativity and the independence of the individuals. Here the infinitely rich content of the subject's property is not for him, he has only what is given to him; he is a passive will. Thus in all his deeds - social as well as personal - man loses entirely his individual Will, his independence, he is not a subject of political life, but only an object of governing; he is in a pure passive state of being governed.

Here we have the most abstract universality, which does not contain in itself the principle of personality, excludes it and because of that it remains without truth and right; the most untrue and rightless organization of the community of individuals in a state. The politovolers of this sort did not know yet what is genuinely right; they did not come to it, even in modern times Marx, Engels, and Lenin failed to understand it. "The general principle that underlies Plato's ideal state violates the right of personality by forbidding the holding of private property. The idea of a pious or friendly and even a compulsory brotherhood of men holding their goods in common and rejecting the principle of private property may readily present itself to the disposition which mistakes the true nature of the freedom of mind and right and fails to apprehend it in its determinate moments. In property my will is the will of a person; but a person is a unit and so property becomes the personality of this arbitrary will. Since property is the means whereby I give my will an embodiment, property must also have the character of being "his" or "mine." This is the important doctrine of the necessity of private property."<sup>(19)</sup> According to Marx-Plato's abstract communism equality has priority over freedom, but Marx should have examined the genuinely speculative ideas of Aristotle and especially Hegel on the notion of equality; they are the philosophers who are worth examining more than anybody else. I would like to quote Hegel's remarks in full: "The equality which may be set up, e. g. in connection with the distribution of the goods, would all the same soon be destroyed again, because wealth depends on diligence. But if a project cannot be executed, it ought not to be executed. Of course men are equal, but only *qua* persons, that is, with respect only to

the source from which possession springs; the inference from this is that everyone must have property.”(20) Aristotle expresses the same idea in his *Politics*; it is a truth as old as the world. But in order to cognise the truth a speculative mind is needed, and this is exactly what Marx lacked.

Universality as it is defined in Marx-Plato's doctrine, is not yet the truly universal, in and for itself having itself Will, because it still does not contain in itself the principle of personality (of individuality, of individualization and subjectivity) but it is precisely the latter that is the true concrete universality, because the truly legal equality, the identity of persons in society is based on the freedom of Rational Will, on the equal independence and the equal dignity of the individuals; namely the subjective individuality is that, which has the absolute purpose in itself, posits that purpose to itself and - as the completely concrete and as a totality of the Absolute Rational Will, - is the free, self-determining realization of the purpose. The universal and the individual, which constitute the strongest infinite opposition, are the moments of the absolute entelechy; the latter as an absolute form with its inherent infinite flexibility interweaves them in an organic unity, in which one moment is as necessary as the other one, and passes over into its opposite so that each of them in its opposite is at home with itself.

However, the unreasonable Will - and such is still the Will in Marx-Plato's conception - invariably divides the opposites from one another and examines the one without its other. This communism is the abstract universality, which has not yet reconciled with the principle of subjectivity, and in consequence remains without truth and freedom; the right of subjective freedom, of personality is not acknowledged in it. That is why in the universal, in the legislation of this type of state, organised on the basis of negation of the principle of individuality, subjective individuality is not at home with itself, but out of itself; it is impossible an actual political freedom to be developed in it, because the Will of the subject is not yet through and through wholly and completely its own genuinely free Will. The subject's own will obtains only the abstract form of universality, because everything individual, peculiar, personal is chased out of it. Thus in and through society the subject does not yet unite freely with the very itself; Plato and Marx throw away the principle of energy, vitality and development from their state. Marx-Plato's idea is and remains perfectly abstract,

which is its greatest disadvantage. In order to be concrete, true, it lacks the principle of individuality, subjectivity, personality; this principle must be made legitimate, ethical in the state, since the latter is a rational organization, which includes in itself all the moments of the Absolute Rational Will.

The universal, the communism, is an absolutely necessary moment of the Absolute Rational Will, but taken in its abstract Marx-Plato's form, it does not contain the personality, the individuality and it is the most abstract and the most lifeless. At this point it is under absolute necessity to accept in itself the principle of infinite free subjectivity, of subjective freedom, and reconcile with it, in order to come to its truth and right, and in doing so to advance to its entelechial rational will, in which truly legal communism is personalism as well. Rational Will has to advance to the opposition of universality and individuality.

Thus, in practical politovolia, as well as in the theoretical politovolia, the subject leaves this stifling world of dark abstractions, – the world of abstract communism, - for which its founding fathers with the unhesitating infinite optimism of Voltaire's *Candid*, maintain, that in this best of the worlds everything goes and will go towards the good; the subject emerges into the light. As a moment of the absolute in universality the form of subjectivity is only in itself, only in possibility. Now - due to its own ends and its absolute urge to realise them and to come to possession of itself within itself, - it sets against the universal.

Plato and Marx were not fated to do that; they failed to acknowledge the contradiction, they wanted to escape it, to destroy it, and consequently they were not capable to advance beyond the abstract communism. However, the Rational Will marches inflexibly towards the true law and freedom. Marx-Plato's doctrine examined only the universal, only the principle of universality; it is insufficient. The Rational Will wills to come into possession of its highest good, i.e. it wills itself alone. It marches towards true right and freedom in which the principle of individuality is as developed and realized as the principle of universality.

Yet, at the beginning the absolute infinite subjectivity puts itself as only finite private property and as public subjective rights. What are to be treated thoroughly

now are these two moments and their determinations. Since time immemorial the institution of private property has been developed in practical politics. Unknown men and women, respecting free creative activity, in and through which the subject is at its own, have gained this great freedom of the subject and proclaimed freedom to be a principle of right and ethical order. It, however, had to be developed to a universal freedom, to relations between free people; we will dwell on it further below. As for the ancient theoretical politics, Aristotle is a great upholder of private property. Taking into consideration the common property and the private property he concludes: "It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured."<sup>(21)</sup> Aristotle does not fail to express how much delight there is in the consciousness of the fact that something belongs to you. He resolutely and with a fiery energy revolts against Plato: "For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill."<sup>(22)</sup> Aristotle knows perfectly well that people take care mainly of what belongs to them personally; they care less for what is common, or they care to the degree, they are concerned. It is superb; law and ethics must be connected with the personal interest of people.

Being a wise rational man, who appreciates temperance, prudence and ethical perfection of person, Aristotle considers, that ethical virtue in man's activity is a mastering of the medium; the extremes - surplus and defect in deeds and passions - are inherent to viciousness. He fairly lashes egoism as an excessive love towards the self and in his praise of moderate love towards the self he says: "And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost by excessive unification of the state... No one, when men have all things in common will any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property."<sup>(23)</sup> It has been already

said in the introduction that not long ago we were witnesses of the deepest, infinitely strong political contradiction between private and common property; now we are to take up them, each separately and for itself. First of all, we face the question: What is the absolute beginning, the principle of private and common property?

This only true and only right beginning of property as such is the greatest that exists in general - the Absolute Entelechy and its self-determining and self-actualising Rational Will; and this only is a truly legal property. It is the only true that in its eternal creativity and eternal vitality causes its reality (the objective world) and sublates this reality in itself; that is why the available being - as mediated by the entelechy, but not by itself - is a finite, untrue being. A lower rank has the thing that is caused compared with what causes it. So the body of a living creature is not enough to itself, but it needs something other; it holds a limited content; it is not the total and united purposeful activity of its creator - the Absolute Entelechy. It is an infirm and created thing in comparison with the might of the creator. All finite things are the entelechy and are not the entelechy. They are the entelechy, because they originate from it: in its eternal life the entelechy causes them and sublates them, returns them back in itself; i.e. they are born by the entelechy and in it they find their end. They are not the entelechy, because it gives them existence since only it exists in and for itself.

The entelechy alone is total in and for itself. The finite is not in and for itself; it has no independent reality. It is created; it is only the realization of the entelechy, but only the entelechy as the truly infinite is in and for itself, it and it alone is the immortal. The entelechy alone has absolute being. If the finite thing needed nothing else and was enough for itself, as a totality it would be in-and-for-itself and as *effectus sui* it would be the endless infinite coming back in itself, i.e. it would be for itself, the absolutely free and the self-determining, that sets its reality by itself, realizes itself; it would be the eternal and the immortal; it would be what only the absolute entelechy is. But it is not; only the entelechy is the truly infinite, which in its endless creative energy causes the world and sublates it in itself and eternally re-creates it again and again.

Namely in its absolute determinateness as individuality, the absolutely infinite and unconditionally universal exists as free for itself: in living nature as a principle of

individualization, and in its supreme form of rational will as a principle of the individual person. In individuality the absolute entelechy is at home with itself, in and through it the infinitely free entelechy gives to itself existence, possesses the very itself. The unconditionally actual, the entelechy as a self-determining and preserving itself unity is the total; in the individual person the absolute entelechy reaches the highest, infinite freedom, which it is able to have in general, since it is the pure person that is the supreme form of its absolute principle "Will yourself." In personality the entelechy self-determines itself to a cognising itself and possessing itself Rational Will and true Freedom.

On its own account personality - as the caused, the created, and as a subject of the principle "Will yourself", - has the infinite necessity to cognise and to take possession of the all-creating absolute entelechy, and in so doing to have it as its property. This principle is the supreme and sovereign organizing beginning of true right of property, power and freedom of the individual person. This absolutely universal principle is predestined to be a subjective (private) property of each individual person; this and this alone is the principle of the great human right to subjective (private) property, freedom and Rational Will. The essential purpose and destiny of man is to be free in his own political activity, to be the master of himself illimitably, to be the owner of his will, wishes, aspirations, knowledge, consciousness, of his whole life

Man is necessary to be regarded as a private property of himself. The latter is one of the moments of the absolute unity of private and universal property, man and man alone is this absolute unity. Man in his free individualization is private property of his absolutely actual personality: of his body, soul, Spirit and Will, of the whole universally accessible wealth of the Absolute Rational Will. Man has as much of this wealth as he has taken in possession of thanks to his abilities, efforts, merits, talents and passions. As far as the degree of possessing, using and disposing of this infinite wealth is concerned, we are only unequal. Each man has his inner, individual life, his personal values; he is in possession of himself. To deprive man of property is equivalent to his physical extermination. The right of property - private as well as public - is sacred and inviolable, and the state as organization of rational freedom provides a categorical defense of the inviolability of private property.

Each individual, personal will possesses the infinite value of the absolute rational will, which in and through man has its absolute purpose for itself; a principle of the

free, infinite person. This principle acts in the history of society, state, political systems and law eternally; it is the absolute beginning, which in its self-determination and realization forms and creates them; it is the basic principle of political freedom of all times. This as much realized as eternally realizing itself principle of personal freedom, as a principle of the general for all persons absolutely rational will necessarily connects all them in an ethical unity. Thus as a principle of private law as well as public law, it organizes personalities - for and through them - in an actual world of political freedom; a world in which the private Will of each individuality overcomes its *particularism* and fills with an universal content, so that it subordinates to the common Will, to the laws of its rational law, has them as its own, finds in them itself, it is at home with itself and thus achieves its true freedom: a rational, free, mutual relation between persons, each of whom “is therefore universal and objective, and possesses the real nature of universality as reciprocity, in that it knows itself to be recognized by its free counterpart, and knows that it knows this in so far as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free,”(24) and therefore, man “behaves in a universally valid manner with regard to others, and acknowledges each as the recognized free person he wants to be himself.”(25)

Civil society, in which the person realizes himself and is acknowledged as a person, is namely the determinate way of organization of subject's freedom. The free rational individuality subordinates itself to the common, takes part in it and at the same time wants to find thoroughly itself, its absolute “I”, its total wealth as a predetermined for it property, to be a member of society and in this way to fuse with itself in and through society, to work with passion and pleasure for its own, private interests and purposes, which are only moments of substantial public interests and purposes, to devote to its own activity, to its own deed with an energy just equal to the degree it is its own deed, to strive for the absolute, to love with all its soul, with all its Rational Will the absolute entelechy, and therefore the very itself. That which the free person's will wants to acquire, the most superb and the best for it, must come out just from it, must be its own desire and independent, free choice of the way towards its purpose, so that being master of itself to take decisions on its own account and bear a full responsibility for its deeds, with which it creates its own fate. The individual Will is in a possession of its absoluteness, of the absolute final purpose and this alone is freedom. The independently acting free person manifests himself as a vigorous will for success during the realization of his private purposes and interests, for free private

initiative and enterprise; he rises as his flag his sovereign and in the highest degree sacred right to form his life activity on the basis of his own responsibility for himself: for his deeds, family and business initiatives. He wants to find his own personal road to success.

In its private property over the means of economic activity the free person's Will has its outer reality which all other people recognise as inviolable and exclude themselves out of it; everyone admits the right of property, because everyone wishes to possess and possesses property in strictly individual proportions, of which he disposes freely, uses it and develops it. And since each rational person knows himself as entirely determined by the absolute entelechy and has its unconditional and universal absolute freedom as his own, everybody recognizes the other one's entire personal freedom of his way of living, his eternal human right to a free and true self-determination and free Will, right to choose freely and to develop himself economically and politically in all directions he considers significant and important to him. Everybody highly appreciates his own absolute independence and readily admits the right of freedom and respects it, not as some particular subject's freedom, but as freedom of man in general, as freedom, which is an absolute right. As Hegel says: "It is only thus that true freedom is established, for since it consists of the being identified with what is mine, I am only truly free when the other is also free, and is recognized as such by me. This freedom of one within the other unites men inwardly, whereas need and necessity only bring them together externally."(26)

Great and sacred is the right of individuality, of subjective individuality, to be the owner of its Spirit and Will, to have the right to choose and to be entitled to possess property and to have it at his disposal freely, to have freedom of thought and Will: in other words to have the total circle of freedom, which is the essence of law and order. The circle, determined by private property, is not yet the highest circle of freedom, which man is able to have in general, but it is absolutely necessary for person's dignity. Hegel cannot but express the absolute necessity of private property: "While the state may cancel private ownership in exceptional cases, it is nevertheless only the state that can do this; but frequently, especially in our day, private property has been re-introduced by the state. For example, many states have dissolved the monasteries, and rightly, for in the last resort no community has so good a right to property as a person has."(27) It is superb and true; such is the requiring unconditional obedience strict discipline of the logic of the very political object, private property provides

better way of managing it. It is wisdom as old as the world; it is expressed in folk proverbs, which are a peculiar form of politovolia. The whole world-history proves the superiority of private ownership to public one. And it is beyond doubt that history is first and foremost the practical self-realization of politovolia in time.

Freedom of property is a logically necessary development and supreme demonstration of the principle of personal freedom. This politovolical principle is the absolute beginning of private law; its deeds find an expression in all the politovolical norms, which arrange the interests and relations in an ethical community by giving autonomy and freedom to private initiatives of different persons. Already the Roman private law had strictly individualistic character; it protected the individual rights of owner and the right of property. The individual had the freedom to sign various contracts. In 1804 Napoleon's code proclaimed the freedom of private property and determine the right to private property as, in principle, unlimited right of the owner to have entire disposal of his property.

Person as such wants to have the freedom to act for himself; the greater this freedom is, the more rational and more vital is the organization of the ethical community, in which the absolutely powerful principle of personal freedom realizes itself as a rational ethic and, therefore, constitutionally regulated free competition among all the competing with themselves independent persons. Each of them wants to outrival the others in possession of the absolute entelechy; this is the determinate way in which the self-cognising and self-possessing absolute entelechy actualises itself as objective possession of each person. This principle is the basis of the energetic Will of the person to develop himself in a vital, dynamic and expansive way and it is manifested in his passion towards competition as such and as an enormous desire for success in increasing the wealth of each person and the community as a whole. Rational free competition is absolutely necessary for each healthy social organism, because it guarantees the community members the highest possible freedom of action.

The absolute subject of state is the cognising himself and possessing himself person, so that the first, absolutely organizing principle is the person, and the state is only the actual organization of personal freedom. In the field of private relations the purpose of the state and the law is to guarantee strengthening and free disposal of private property, a uniform law for all subjects of business life, providing the greatest

ethical freedom of trade and industry. The legal form of being in possession of the world of goods has a purpose: to enable development of the entire activity of man; unreasonable limits of any kind in using of the private property, which is possessed by individuals, would impede individual activity in the process of accumulating common wealth.

And if, likewise Plato and Marx, someone wants to equalize properties and in general to destroy the very institution of private property, he wants the unachievable. As Aristotle says: “The legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount. Further, if he prescribes this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws.”<sup>(28)</sup> He must make equal the aspirations, the strivings, the wills of men which are impossible to be equalized: “For appetite is in its nature unlimited, and the majority of mankind live for the satisfaction of appetite.”<sup>(29)</sup> The Will to acquire great wealth is absolute: “And the riches that are derived from this art of wealth-getting are truly unlimited; for just as the art of medicine is without limit in respect of health, and each of the arts is without limit in respect of its end (for they desire to produce that in the highest degree possible)... so also this wealth-getting has no limit in respect of its end, and its end is riches and the acquisition of goods in the commercial sense... The cause of this state of mind is that their interests are set upon life but not upon the good life; as therefore the desire for life is unlimited, they also desire without limit the means productive of life. And even those who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also seems to be found in the possession of property, all their energies are occupied in the business of getting wealth.”<sup>(30)</sup>

Although the Absolute Rational Will produces and will invariably produce the contradiction between private and common property of the means of production, it is not the supreme degree of contradiction, which the absolute entelechy holds. In its free activity it eternally creates their contradiction and overcomes the latter insuperably through reconciling the opposites with one another. Speculatively speaking, both moments are absolutely indispensable. They are bound to reconcile with one another in Aristotle’s golden medium, in which one moment is as necessary as the other one. In this process the Absolute Rational Will fuses with itself and is for itself. Only pure abstraction, which still does not know and does not possess the

infinite flexibility of the absolute material actuality, can raise to the idea of common property and regard people as only common people, the result being that property is neither individualized nor personalized; abstract thinking never goes beyond the inanimate universality, which is devoid of spirit and Will. It is rightless and untrue and there is no freedom in it. It lacks the free infinite personality, which is the greatest of politovolia, the supreme actualisation of the entelechial spiritual Will. The abstract is unreal and it is not living; this is the eternal and implacable fate of each abstraction. We are not aiming to examine the conceptions of private and common property in their narrow political economy's framework as only property over the means of production; let us now examine their deepest and most intensive politovolical value in more details.

The activity of Rational Will and its possessing is one and the same thing. I act as far as I have my own spiritual-willed nature, as far as I have freedom to act, as far as I have taken possession of my property, but everyone is "I" and everyone has his "mine" i.e. the absolute content is a subjective, private property of every concrete, individual person and at the same time it belongs to man as such, to the purely common "I", in other words, it is an universal property of the free for itself mankind. It is the supreme contradiction of the Rational Will, but in its infinite might and as the unconditionally acting, it bears in itself that contradiction and solves it as a free political life of the ethical community of individuals. The objective, intellectual-willed world and the wealth of its determinations, such as science, knowledge, law, ethics, industrial and trade skills, are a common property; in this world every human individual as well as every human political community move in its own property, it is at itself. The rational organization of man's community as such requires the essence, the substance of individual Will to be the purely common self-determination of the absolute individual thinking Will; an unity of universal and individual Will, which is in and for itself having just itself. It is this Will and this unity that are the purpose and predetermination of individual person: not to act according to his purely arbitrary, miserable, self-willed Will, but in accordance with the rational self-determinations of the universal in and for itself existing Will.

The state is the living self-organization of this as much individual as common property of in-itself-and-for-itself having itself Rational Will. Since we are interested

in developing of the concept of property and the concept of state is an essential part of this development, for the needs of our examination here, let us retrace in a few words the history of state. Here again the infinite speculative Rational Will of the absolute material actuality acts in strict accordance with its own method and passes the same way, revealed up to now; it cannot be otherwise. In its self-organization as an ethical community, the absolute entelechy develops from the abstract universal common property of the primitive (tribal) community and the Roman concept of state as a common good, (*res publica*) to the state as private property of the ruler in the early feudal state. At that time the monarchy had a patrimonial character. Not only was the king a ruler, but he also was an owner of the state. The power of the absolute ruler in the state was deduced from private law. According to that conception, over the land of the given territory spread the unlimited power of its owner, while the being of the state depended on the "private will" of the owner, who ruled freely and was the master of the kingdom and regarded it as his private property. Private Will triumphed over public law. However, it was neither capable of grasping the concept of public affairs from the point of view of the common interest of the whole country nor of realizing that the state included all its citizens and state authority had to act in the interest of all. There existed no legal order to protect the interests of private individuals (subjects as they were called in the times of feudalism); the subject of the country had no law base to defend his rights and could not look for justice in case of his rights being infringed by ruling authorities.

Later this state of affairs changed radically. The idea of state as a common (public) good spread again. According to this idea, the state is a sovereign constitutional person and possesses authorities expressing its Will. A conception begins to blaze a trail, that the nation expresses the Will of the state, while the monarch is only its mediating organ. Actually, however, the sovereignty was still concentrated in the personality of the ruler. The absolute monarchy appeared when a more modern conception of state citizenship with public and legal character was formed. The relations between the state and its subjects were no more dominated by personal relations, and all the subjects of the country were unconditionally subordinated to the state government. The ruler possessed absolute uncontrolled power and he was not accountable for his actions. The monarch had absolute power over the state. This total power included all the spheres of social life: the whole executive power, the

legislature and the judicial power as well as economy and education; it was even occupied with small-minded regulation of social life, including the private - home and family - life of the subjects. This total administrative activity of the state, which was more a regime of arbitrariness than a legal order, made the subjects entirely defenceless, was called "police". The absolute monarchy gained the character of a police state; it limited the subjects' freedom extremely. The subject was only an object of public law; his role in relation to the state was based on the one-sided duty to subdue to the resolutions of the authorities.

The time had come a victorious and absolutely necessary political revolution of the new dynamic class, the bourgeoisie, to overthrow the absolute monarchy and feudalism, in order to force the government of the state out of the hands of the privileged feudal aristocracy, with the monarch ahead, and to liquidate the absolute all-power of the monarch, being illimitable master of the property and the lives of the subjects and in this way with impunity violating their sacred and inviolable private property; a revolution called to create a world of freedom. But at first this revolution was expressed in its scientific political form. The starting point of the first theoreticians of capitalism in England and France as well as all the philosophers of the Enlightenment was the eternal and unalterable right of nature, in which first and foremost they saw the basis for the unlimited freedom of the individual owner, subdued till then by the despotism. John Locke considered that man bears in himself eternal and unalterable rights by birth: a right of life, freedom and property. For him private property is a natural right prior to the state, which is created for its defence. In 1762 in his work *The social contract* Jean-Jacques Rousseau rejected whatever kind of compromise with the absolute monarchy, enlightened or not, and recognised as sovereign the nation, not the king. According to Hegel Rousseau examined what the absolute justification of the state is, and proclaimed that free Will is the principle of that justification.

And this bourgeois-democratic revolution was accomplished. From that moment on the teaching of state was based on free Will. The theory of nation's sovereignty, the constitutional guarantee of citizens' rights, introduced by the *Declaration of the rights of man and citizen* and by the first French constitutions, as well as the theory of division of power, were the main programme fundamentals of bourgeois democracy, and laid the foundations of state constitution; constitutionalism

was an incarnation of the principle of rule of the law, a principle of faultless observing law regulations by citizens as well as by state authorities. The absolute police state and arbitrary acts of the authorities were replaced by the constitutional state, which subordinated to law all the activities peculiar to the police state. The victorious Great French Revolution made subjective freedom the principle of the modern world. The conception, that a purpose of every political organization is defence of the inviolable and natural rights of man triumphed; for the first time in world history the relationship person-state became bilateral: the subject became a citizen. Person became a subject of the public - constitutional and administrative, - law, which guaranteed the subjective public rights of person. Person could appear in court as a litigant in defence of his rights on an equal base with state. In accordance with the theory of division of power courts of justice became independent and were able to try cases impartially, all the more that citizens had the right to initiate legal proceedings against the state.

Now man can participate actively in the functioning of the political system. This is his new constitutional status, which is guaranteed by universal suffrage, the right of equal access to public services, freedom of speech, freedom of assemblies and associations, freedom of religion. The competences of authority must be subordinated to civil rights, not vice versa. Freedom can be preserved in society only when law and respect to man's dignity and his ethical freedom guide the government. Thus the subjective public rights of person, his civil rights and freedoms determine the limits of state's competences and, at the same time, they are a guarantee directed against state's interference in the sphere of free decisions and free choice of person, in other words, in the sphere of his free Will. The last is recognised by *legal* state order, which with the creation of administrative *legal procedure* guarantees the defence of subjective public rights and the preserved by law interests of the human person. An article 4 of *The declaration of the rights of man and citizen* defines freedom as a right to do everything that does not harm other men; it is limited only by the freedom of other people, as well as the interest and security of state.

That is in broad outlines the history of state - the great deed of our predecessors. Here we were briefer, for it is well known. Owing to and on the basis of the Western principle of personality, those superb pluralistic liberal-democratic societies originated, which used to be so admirable for us, the people of Eastern

Europe. The disadvantage of the whole that politovolia built on the doctrine of the natural law, Hegel and other philosophers, and still actual today, is that it does not go out of the boundaries of only the finite rational Will. The determinations in which this Will takes possession of itself - private property and subjective public rights, - are only finite determinations, each of them differs from its other, but neither of them yet has developed the infinite determinateness, containing in itself its other as sublated. The circle of property of the Rational Will, which includes only the private property, has the state as something other, as its limit and therefore, it is only a still limited finite property. The "I" as such has not yet managed to expand this circle, to include in it the state as well. In other words the "I" has not performed and achieved the total process of its absolute self-owning. At this stage, although the Rational Will of the absolute personality thinks and wants itself in the categories of private property, it neither masters itself as a private property of itself, nor grasps the state and the subjective public rights as the developed and eternally developing possession and use of its total rational-willed nature yet. Since time immemorial and ages now private law and the Rational Will thinking itself in the terms of private property have been leaving their mark and their deep groove in politovolia, so that no other property is manifested and can be thought of but the private property, and even the politovolia of today still does not think of calling the subjective public rights and the state a property - a subjective public property, - of the human person as such.

Hence in up-to-date politovolia we still have a limitation of Rational Will, which has not yet taken possession of itself in its absolute infinity, as an infinite property of the very itself; this and this alone is its absolute and supreme purpose. Thus, the Rational Will comes into possession of itself; it is in its own property and unites with itself, - the beginning and the end become one. This is the task of the newest, speculative politovolia. In accordance with it "the I" has the purpose to create an actual world of its total property, to find in everything only itself; it is the absolute form, which in the activity of its actual self-obtaining of property wants to have power over the whole fullness of the possessed by it content so that in its own content to meet with itself and to have itself for the very itself. That is why the state is not a limit for the Rational Will of "the I", who sublates the state with the result that in-and-through the latter he takes possession of himself for himself as his own absolute property.

Let us, however, examine this in more details. Universal personality is the basic concept of *politovolia* - the infinite free subjectivity of the highest principle of the absolute entelechy "Will yourself" – and the whole content of *politovolia* is based only on the unity of universality and personality. A subject of the world history is the absolute determinateness of personality, which in its self-determining and self-realizing activity enters in possession of the very itself and in the process of its self-development it wants to attain an infinite possession of itself. The latter is nothing else but a possession of its supreme good – freedom. Freedom is the highest determinateness of the Rational Will of personality and it is the principle of the absolute right of the latter. The world-history manifests the process of actual self-freeing of man: that is to say, the process of his in-and-through-himself taking possession of himself. By virtue of its entelechial nature freedom has necessity for revealing itself both practically and theoretically. That is why it is present to a certain extent in every true *politovolical* teaching: of course, it is missing neither in the doctrine of natural law nor in Hegel's philosophy. Nonetheless, Hegel was the philosopher who expressed the content of the above mentioned doctrine superbly. Developing the science of philosophy, he sublated this content, subordinated it to the supreme principle of spirit "Cognise yourself"; he often speaks for the Will, existing in and for itself, but he failed to reach the truly highest principle of the Rational Will "Will yourself" and in consequence he omitted to rise to the idea of true freedom as an in-itself-and-for-itself having itself property of the Rational Will.

Now we have to examine the same content from the point of view of that genuinely supreme principle of the Rational Will; owing to it a completely new, more intensive and deeper argumentation becomes possible and we can develop the concept of property. Development invariably entails revealing new moments; in this case it involves introducing new *politovolical* categories and terminology. First and foremost let us introduce the fruitful idea of public property, not in its material and substantial sense as it is usually done - and then as a public property is considered the state's nature with its land, mountains, air and waters, as well as public roads and public enterprises, - but as the totality of determinations of a political community of human beings who possess, use and have at their disposal their own spiritual-willed nature. By public property we are going to understand the total self-organization of the possessing itself universal Rational Will, which self-organization results in freedom of Will; but namely the state is the determinate way of this self-organization and its

result. This broadest, most speculative definition of public property includes in itself the living, acting constitution as a system of determinations and organization of justice and public freedom in each concrete state. It includes the principles and the organization of power, the observing of the common state interest and the stipulations of law, the rational state life as a totally developed world of freedom and a guarantee of public freedom and the subjective public rights as a universal good as well as the sovereignty of the state.

The whole world history presents the becoming and the development of actual freedom in the state, and together with it the increasing intensive taking possession of common, public property by the nations as concrete human communities, and the increasingly developed and - thanks to that, - increasingly freer possession, use and disposal of their actual supreme property. That is why it is true that each nation has such a government what it deserves, because the government is the determinate way, in which a nation uses and is a master of its public property. Here is important the sovereignty of the community (nation) as an unlimited and actually possessed might to create its laws, constitution, way of ruling, government and freedom, in other words, to be master of its public property illimitably.

World history also presents the course of development of public property from only the abstract universality of public property during the primitive order through the private public property (of one only in the early feudal state or of several only in the early capitalist state) to the concrete, truly universal and really public property of all by means of general election, common participation in political life, equal access to social and government posts and last but not least general equality before the laws. It was not until the Great French Revolution that the World-Will began its advance to common possession, use and disposal of public property; the subjective public rights are just a part of this way and a great achievement of capitalism since then. But the self-developing Rational Will is still in its very beginning; the march of history does not end up to here. With universal suffrage and equality before the laws, the person as such becomes a subject of public property and begins attaining his absolute subjective public property - sacred and inviolable, because it is the having itself absolute entelechy. A new political category is coined here: subjective public property. We cannot but pay close attention to it since it presents the new task that Rational Will sets itself. From now on, the Rational Will

of the absolute personality is to develop, cognise and possess better itself as its subjective public property.

Thus the supreme principle of the absolute “I” – “Will yourself” - at last in its development begins to realize itself as a property of each individual; the right of subjective public property, to which belong the constitutional law and all the rights and freedom of modern democracies, is a universal right, a right of every human person. The human rights and freedoms, the principles and the infinite wealth of Rational Will by right are a property of every rational Will; and only when the latter takes possession of and is in possession of its property, it is free. The right of subjective public (i.e. political) property is uniformly and inseparably interwoven with the right of private property and along with private property it creates the supreme and sovereign property of the ethical personality. Like private property, which gives its bearer, the owner, the right to possess it, to use it and to be master of it, public property too gives each person the right to possess it, to use it, that is to say to practise it participating in the political life of the state and to be master of it during free parliamentary elections.

Much in the same manner as contemporary Western conservative thought, - which regards equality as only equality before the laws, not as an abstract economical equality, more as an universal spiritual-willed one than as material equality, - the will for property in its dialectical self-movement from and through itself sublates the only abstract common property over the means of production and puts on its place a concrete and truly legal public property of person. This subjective public property is inalienable; man is predetermined - to have property, to have freedom in and through society, in and through a political community. He is vitally interested in the best organization of society as a constitutional state, to which he strives for constantly and which he will tirelessly perfect as a guarantee of freedom, justice and general prosperity; a state which is based on the principle of subjective public property. According to the latter every human person has at his disposal a well-deserved part of public power and together with others takes a part in the government of the state; it is bound to realize itself, to become a principle of the world.

This is the direction to which world-history marches nowadays. It will change the model of modern western parliamentary democracy. Theoretically the latter is

regarded as a rule of public opinion - a power higher than the government and the parliament; to a certain degree it is true. Parliamentary democracy provides open discussing of problems and free seeking of the truth and the best constitution, free competition of various political forces, freedom of meetings, associations and formation of political parties, free confrontation of political programmes claimed by different political parties, constitutional state order, equality before the law and freedom of information, right to political self-determination of person, influence of society on the course of public affairs, right of society to control its political representatives in parliament, strict constitutional control over authorities, et cetera. Practically, however, modern western democracy is imperfect and deplorable; it is still not the determinate way, in which the personality as such and society as whole, uses and is the master of its public property at this early stage of self-development and self-realization of the principle of subjective public property. As we shall see below, liberal states ruled by law are possible and will exist insofar as the person as such (respectively the society as such) takes possession of his (respectively its) public property - the state and its political life as his (of the person) own life and his own deed - and is the actual owner of himself.

It is the principle of the absolute infinite freedom "Will yourself" that manifests itself as a principle of subjective public property. The human person completely owns, uses and has in his disposition that sphere of freedom, which he has mastered for himself as a member of free society ruling its public property. But the degree of possessing of that his property for every concrete person is strictly individual; it is where persons are and will always be unequal. Not only are individuals unequal as far as energy of Spirit and Will towards knowledge and prosperity, talents, abilities and diligence are concerned, but also unequal is the actually done by each individual hard work of Spirit and Will for achieving their purposes. Contradictory relations of one personal Will to other wills arise and as a result appears the division of society into classes; these are contradictions, originated by the rational will, which bears them in itself and overcomes them, achieving its organic unity. The great theoretical and ethical problems, faced by the Rational Will in each following epoch, are just an expression of its contradictions, which it creates in its eternally living process of seeking truth and justice, surmounts and overcomes them, coming back to itself, cognising and possessing ever deeper its rational freedom.

Now that the concept of public subjective property has been introduced, the Rational Will as such sublates its limitation, it contains no limit in itself, for it does not exist anything, which is not the very it. In everything it recognises and possesses only itself through itself, i.e. it has for its object just itself. Thus the thinking Will is infinite; it reaches its infinite meaning and takes possession of its absolute infinite property. Private property and subjective public property can exist only as interwoven; each of them, aspiring to develop as totality, with necessity contains its own other, causes it, keeps it and includes entirely in itself. The Absolute - the infinite absolute "I" as such, - sublates the limit between private and subjective public property, infinitely mediates and unites them, and in so doing manifests itself as absolute property having itself for itself, as in-and-for-itself having itself absolute property of the Rational Will of "the I".

The speculative *politovolia* is a cognising self-possessing of the Rational Will in its absolute infinity. But Hegel did not know about the in-and-for-itself having itself property: the absolute, which has to be cognised and possessed in everything. Wherever we look into his works, we will not find that concept of property; it was not the great question of his epoch. It is nowadays that we can determine freedom, as a cognising itself and having itself Rational Will. The highest property of human person is his freedom and self-dependence and only that property and its defence are the source of law. To be the owner of your Will, means to have your Rational Will as free, to have your personal freedom, personal independence. The free man, - that for itself having itself property of the very itself, - in his own activity demonstrates himself as free infinite subjectivity.

The infinite subjectivity, the free Rational Will of the absolute *entelechy* possesses the content caused by its creative activity - this eternal world, which is a realization of the principle of freedom "Will yourself" - as its property. It is precisely individuality in which the absolute *entelechy* realizes its infinite returning to itself and that is the determinate way in which it masters its own absolute wealth for itself and takes possession of the very itself as a property of itself. Thus, its greatest and absolute right is able to be a property of any Rational Will and, therefore, according to the concept of subjective freedom, the individual person with absolute necessity must have property, must have the total content of the absolute *entelechy* as a content of his own Will infinitely and unconditionally. The absolute unity of private and public property

is an immanent purpose of the individual; in all spheres of his activity, in everything, man knows and wants to know, has and wants to have only the very himself, to attain, to have and to use this concrete world as his personal world. Thus he realizes the great deed of the self-enriching absolute entelechy; his activity is only independent and free self-possessing of the entelechy, and thus, the own self-possessing of the entelechy: the infinitely possessing itself property of what has already taken possession of itself. This and this alone is absolute freedom - the supreme purpose of the absolute entelechy. The last one is as much already realized, as eternally realizing itself in the process of creation and development of state organizations and their constitutions. The possessing itself Rational Will is the principle of the true constitution; person is free, he rules his absolute property and everybody recognizes his right to rule it and he recognizes this right to any other person. This true constitution that will proclaim freedom as an absolute property of human person is to be written, but the beginning has already been put. This world of absolute freedom and free thinking Wills is the most superb and the greatest and there is nothing more superb and greater than it on Earth. In the whole objective actuality the person - as a principle of the knowing itself and possessing itself absolute subjectivity – finds and takes possession only of himself, unites with himself, while the above mentioned principle is as much a principle of freedom of property as it is a principle of property of freedom, of freedom as a property - and this definition is the turning point, which has been made by today's politovolia...

The individual, personal Will of the subject is the absolutely first and the highest all-embracing determination in the organization of property, power and freedom, but as we saw above, Marx-Plato's doctrine failed to go beyond the sphere of the abstract universality, which does not contain organically in itself the individuality, the subject, the person as such. The abstract universal, the abstract communism is only in itself, only in possibility; its common people have only common purposes and have to act obligatory in a total unity in the name of society, for society and only in that way for themselves. Plato wanted only *communisation* of man; he was afraid of the *personalization*. But every step forward to the personalization of man is also a step forward to the true and lawful, free and rational *communisation* of man for he has the urge of the absolute to develop himself as the most concrete and true in-and-for-himself possessing himself universal individuality. The deepest personalism is also absolute *communism*.

All things considered we have to say that Marx developed Plato only, but those who think that Plato's ideas are forever dead are wrong. They were only refuted speculatively, so that Plato's principle is and has to be retained. The principle of the universal, the common for all people public good of necessity during the primitive social order; it was discovered by Plato more than 2500 years ago and it is here to stay. At this point it is relevant to mention what Hegel used to say against the enemies of religion: it is not possible that in the course of two millenniums the human reason has not dealt with the rational and the true; it would be commonplace. Hegel wants to cognise the true in Christian religion and he cognises it. As far as Marx-Plato's principle is concerned we have to say that in the course of 2500 years human reason has dealt with a moment of the rational. But having a profound respect for the public in large, which think that communism was completely discredited, although it was only naturally refuted and sublated, let us instead of the expression communist society introduce the superb Aristotelian category of polity (*politeia*) - it entails the notions of political community and the body politic.

The entelechial Rational Will wills to have itself as its supreme property: the more it enters in possession of itself, the freer it is. In general the supreme freedom of man consists in knowing and possessing himself as a legal entity (as a political entity) that is entirely determined by the absolute right. According to the latter the person is as much social as the society is personalized; the best organization of ethics is actual only as an organic unity of common and personal freedom, i.e. as a total freedom, freedom for the whole community and each individual as well, so that the individual submits himself to the genuinely universal, to the law of the in-and-for-itself having itself Rational Will. *Personalism* must not be understood as an extreme individualism, but as a mature and wise use of one's absolute property; the free and rational *personalism* is at the same time the deepest politism. The state - the polity, the free political community requires a free and at the same time rational (i.e. controlled by the political community) market as well as free public institutions and true constitutions, it realizes itself in and through them and will invariably realize itself in and through them. It has these truly lawful forms of freedom, which is the supreme property of the Rational Will of "the I" as its immanent necessity. Only in and through freedom of the thinking Rational Will of each individual, only when he knows and wants the universal Will, which is his absolutely true and lawful objective, the

universal political freedom blooms in the polity and every political person takes possession of his absolute property in its actual organisation as a polity.

In both practical and theoretical politovolia, Plato's principle has been refuted. It is definitely not the highest moment of the supreme politovolical principle, but it is essentially as important as the principle of infinite free subjectivity, of individualization, of personality. The subject of world-history is the in-and -for-himself taking possession of himself universal political person, who in the united process of organizing the state out of himself and through himself makes himself what he is: a process, which is as much an absolute personalism as an absolute politism. These are the two moments of politovolical acting. Each of them contains in itself the other one and in its self-development to totality is an absolute transition to the other one; they are adequate. The history of humanity is the process of developing the political person as such; this is the supreme standpoint out of which and through which we can understand the world-history in its truth. The whole world-history of politovolia is an absolute movement, an absolute aspiration for actualisation of the universal political personalism and actual development of this personalistic politism. Only from this aspiration, the world-history could be understood in its truth and right. Political systems of necessity replace one another so that each of them is only a stage in the development of the Absolute Will. The purpose of speculative politovolia can be no other but to reveal the development of its subject with its inherent absolute necessity, to show us all its former stages as necessary, i.e. to cognise them as a result of the development of the Absolute Will and its freedom.

The person as such is constantly in the process of freeing himself as a political person and each "I" wants to possess himself, to be the master of himself, to be recognized his dignity for an independent politovolical activity. Every person wants to possess, to use and realize his absolute right to freedom as an actual common right, which in the absolute totality of its determinations belongs to every individual person; and this is as much realized as it is in the eternal process of self-realizing. The universal human right to freedom as an absolute and supreme property of the Rational Will is precisely what is truly legal and truly great in politovolia. It is the absolute principle of each constitutional state; a principle, which constitutionally guarantees the subjective public rights of the individual person and its right to free conscious choice and free politovolical activity. The private purposes and interests of each person can be realized if only the purposes of the in-and-for-itself-having-itself

universal Will are carried out into practice within the political community. Man invariably develops himself as a knowing and possessing himself absolutely actual person, in whom and through whom the Absolute Rational Will strives to come to itself and to realize its truth and right. And it overwhelmingly realizes them in its political actuality, which is an absolute unity of rational politics and unconditional personalism. Together with the progress of the universality and the culture of the Rational Will man as such develops as an in-and-for-himself having himself political person, i.e. as an "I", which is "We" and "We", which is "I". He is the great product of the world history; a product, which acts in the latter and which from- and- through itself eternally cognises and takes into possession itself for itself.

The essential question of today's politics is: How much is the state a public property of the people, or - we can say, - a subjective public property of the person as such? The answer is: We are at a very early stage of political personalism - the golden mean between polity and personality (individuality). We live in a realm of civil freedom in which citizens act for their own personal good or private interests rather than for the common good of the polity. It all began with the ethical community of early capitalism that introduced the principle of representative democracy in the world; a principle, which was a tremendous step forward in comparison with feudalism. Hegel must have been fascinated by that principle, because in many places of his works he says: "In the East only one individual is free; in Greece the few are free; in the Teutonic world the saying is true that all are free, that man is free as man."<sup>(31)</sup> However, the fact remains that universal concrete freedom was not the actuality of the political communities of Hegel's time yet; they were and modern states still are a far cry from being democratic. A political system in which the so called citizen votes once every four years is a form of modern slavery, the reason being that once he has voted, his vote does not belong to him, but to his representative. The citizen alienates his Will and fully depends on his representative's Will and ideas. For more than two centuries, national elections have been part of a publicity spectacle designed to mask a political system that is not capable of being genuinely democratic. Despite the entire demagoguery about human rights, political freedom is still not a universal right of all citizens because the person as such still does not have a very considerable degree of possession of objective public property and actual political participation is a privilege of the elite. It is no secret that rich corporations control the political system of today through campaign funding and

increasingly concentrated control of media, culture and the economy. No wonder that a system which works without democratic authority and which is controlled by a political and economic establishment unavoidably results in placing profits before the general public welfare and the environment. Public political life is reduced to imagery.

This is the reason that more and more people do not feel part of the process of decision-making. Their voices are drowned out by the power of big money. For years we have been told that globalization - the march of the big capital around the world, - is benign, that it is a process that brings about the greatest good for the greatest number of people, that good citizenship lay in accepting the impersonal rule of the market and good governance means a government that should be as less intrusive as possible and get out of the way of market forces. This frenetic marketising hides behind grand principles. It is camouflaged by claims about peace, democracy, human rights and progress. But beyond the hyperbole, its promoters - the present "me" generations, - believe mainly in civil society where the private sphere outweighs the polity. The market is king. The aggregate of the desires and actions of buyers in the market both drives and steers the economy. This "invisible hand" determines what goods are available at what price, what industries thrive and which fail; what the people vote for with their money is what they get. As a result large parts of Europe have started to move away from the traditional European styles of welfare provision. The underlying trend is clear: in the present economic and political climate it looks as if Europe is on its way to waving goodbye to the welfare state as we once knew it. The result is that the economy is more in focus than the governments' solidarity with the weaker sections of society, that the planet is being polluted for profit, that huge amounts of money from giant corporation are given to bribe elected but not directly controlled officials. Promoting the interests of the big economic organizations the new globalized elites try to conform to what they believe to be the logic of globalization and say that in the age of globalization nation-states have become obsolete forms of social organisation.

Thus the full flowering of the idea of democracy - the rule of, by and for the people, - is still to be seen. There are more and more people of vision and concern, who know that voting every few years between unaccountable pre-selected politicians is not even part-time democracy. These people are not being heard outside of their own circles thanks to a corrupted media and some extremely complacent attitudes.

But there is no doubt that the time for change has come. Over two centuries individuals have identified themselves as citizens of nations in territories where modern states make rules. They have been taught that they live in democracy, make important decisions and express their Will by choosing their representatives to an elected parliament. It is true that freedom can only be maintained through a sharing of political power but we still live in a political system that has always separated those who do the governing from those who are governed, the ruled from the rulers, in other words, a political system of rulers and subjects. This is a modern kind of feudalism in which only an elite few are free and participate in the decision-making process and the vast majority of the people lives in a civil society and are the passive objects of the process of political ruling which for more than two centuries has been done by a special political class. No wonder that so far the whole process of educating young people has been directed towards achieving civil freedom not political freedom.

And yet we are at the very beginning of a turning point in the development of communities of people and polities; a turning point which is as important as the Reformation and the influenced by Marxism social democratic movement. Political freedom is to become a universal right of all individuals; this is the immediate task of the World-Will, which will insuperably achieve what it wants. It is the necessary development of politovolia in the nearest future. The principle of representative democracy in modern political systems is exactly what the principle of private property is for the economic system. In his *Philosophy of Right* Hegel treats the principle of representation as a rational moment of the modern state but he failed to say that only at a certain stage of its development the absolute principle of politovolia: "Will yourself" posits itself as a principle of representative democracy. But as a principle of eternal self-development the absolute principle of Rational Will has the internal urge to develop itself to ever higher forms, each one of which necessarily refutes its previous stages. In modern states of representative democracy the free Rational Will still does not mediate itself in itself with itself. This and this alone is the reason that representative democracy is developing its truly higher form of direct democracy so that the political person as such can possess, use and participate in the ruling of his subjective public property within his community or, generally speaking, polity. The latter is the determinate way in which the Absolute Will comes to total possession of itself so that each person has the state Will as his own and is politically free in politically organized and governed community i.e. in a polity based on the

absolute priority of the common good over the private good. Such a state, or otherwise, political community, in which the sovereign power belongs to the people and they exercise it through referendums and direct democracy, is the nearest solution of the problems of modern politovolia. Direct democracy means that polities, not corporations or corrupted representative governmental authorities, have direct control over decisions that affect themselves or their polity resources. The person as such is not anymore a subject (as in feudalism) or a citizen (as he has been for two centuries), but a politician - a member of polity, - who can make informed and responsible decisions about issues and concerns that matter to him and his political community. For political freedom - the highest point of property of the "I" as such, - is more important than civil freedom and citizens enjoy it only in so far as they participate in the political life of their communities, in which they are both rulers and ruled simultaneously.

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## NOTES

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