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# **ON THE ABSOLUTE RATIONAL WILL**

**(SUBLATION OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY)**

-----Volume 2-----

**Further development of the Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will**

## **II. On the Soul**

**[and why did Hegel fail to become a rational voluntarist?]**

The reason I based the philosophy of Absolute Rational Will on Hegel and Aristotle's philosophies is that these are the two most speculative philosophers in the history of philosophy. Yet the fact remains that Aristotle's philosophy has one advantage that Hegel's certainly lacks: it is – as Hegel acknowledges, - that Aristotle is a thinking empiricist. This chapter will be especially concerned with the fact that being a rational philosopher, a speculative thinker only, Hegel failed to comprehend and to point out that Aristotle was a thinking voluntarist as well. True, - as Hegel justly claims, - Aristotle's philosophy does not have a first principle under which everything is subsumed. However, it is for this reason that Aristotle's philosophy is both rational and voluntaristic; Aristotle was the first rational voluntarist in history. As for Hegel, - as we will see, - due to his entirely cognitive principle he failed to become and did not actually have the remotest chance of becoming a rational voluntarist.

Let us now examine the thesis of the present chapter in more detail. There is no denying that the further we go into the details of Aristotelian philosophy - as Hegel authoritatively states, - "the more interesting it

becomes, and the more do we find the connection which exists among the subjects. The fullness with which I have set forth the principal content of the Aristotelian philosophy is justified both by the importance of the matter itself, because it offers to us a content of its own, and also by the circumstances already mentioned (p. 118), that against no philosophy have modern times sinned so much as against this, and none of the ancient philosophers have so much need of being defended as Aristotle." (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, volume 2, *Plato and the Platonists*, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 224) However, - as will be argued below, - the problem is that Hegel is a sinner as well; as we will see Hegel's original sin is that in line with his clearly defined cognitive only principle, he takes from Aristotle only what he needs.

One of the fundamental categories on which the philosophy of the Absolute Rational Will is based is Aristotle's *entelechy* (*entelecheia*). While it is true that Aristotle's *entelecheia* has been forgotten for centuries, the fact remains that it is a crucial category and absolutely deserves to be re-discovered in its truth and re-introduced in the philosophy of our time. The most important of properties of matter is entelechy - not only as a mechanical movement or a chemical process, but as a volition, conation, or all the more as entelechy - the category of actuality is a bad translation of Aristotle's concept of entelechy.

Now our task is to examine Aristotle's excellent work *On the Soul* from the point of view of the Absolute Rational Will. A careful examination of Aristotle's works *Metaphysics* and *On the Soul* shows that Hegel's reading of Aristotle is far from being perfect. He claims that the self-reflecting thinking (the thinking itself thought) is the highest apex of Aristotle's speculative philosophy. For Hegel, the main moment in Aristotle's philosophy is that thought and what is thought are one and the same, that the objective and the thought are one and the same, i.e. that thought is the thought of thought. True, Aristotle's nous (reason) thinks itself since it is the supreme, the most powerful; it is the thinking itself thought. Yet, Aristotle is an empiricist. This speculative idea - the thinking itself thought, - is not the

principle of his philosophy; it is not determined as the highest principle of the Absolute. Hegel acknowledges that. As a matter of fact, more is to be found in Aristotle but Hegel abides to the principle of his intellectualistic philosophy and never goes beyond his pure logical speculative philosophy.

Unlike Hegel, for Aristotle Reason, the thinking itself thought, is not the only principle of the Absolute for he as a thinking empiricist. Appetite (including desire, sensuous impulse, instincts) is manifestation of the volitional active powers of the Absolute and Aristotle acknowledges that. As I have shown - in chapter III of the first volume of my book "On the Absolute Rational Will," – in his work *On the soul* Aristotle attains to the idea that appetite, desire is the origin of movement toward some goal: "That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement-mind and appetite-they would have produced movement in virtue of some common character. As it is, mind is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite." (Aristotle, *On the Soul*, Translated by J. A. Smith, book III, chapter 10) What Aristotle still does not attain to is the standpoint that Entelechy is manifestation of the ends of the Absolute Volition, i.e. of the Absolute Rational Will. Yet, without doubt Aristotle was for Voluntarism what Anaxagoras was for Intellectualism. In its complete reality Material Entelechy is the end that achieves its complete realisation, i.e. it is Will - a material volition, which in-and-through itself organises (Hegel would say "determines") itself. Thus, it is the Willing, which enters in possession of itself. The ends of the material entelechy are ends of the absolute willing, which exists for itself alone so that everything else exists only through it (the absolute willing). The material rational will is the principle of the absolute (of nature).

Aristotle is aware that matter and form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually, "for each thing is a unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one." (Metaphysics, Translated by W. D. Ross, Book VIII, part 6) He is aware of the unity of matter and entelechy. He

says: "It is obvious then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is and how it exists - one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed of these two." (Metaphysics, Translated by W. D. Ross, Book VIII, part 2) True, Aristotle does not assume Entelechy as pure, absolute form; for him, matter and entelechy are one and the same. Yet, he claims that Entelechy is the forming, the governing principle of matter. It is the higher principle in comparison with matter; the latter is only the passive substratum (the potency), which is formed by the purposeful activity, by entelechy. He says that the "The soul is in the primary way that by means of which we live, perceive, and think. Hence it will be a kind of principle and form, and not matter or subject." i.e., substratum. "Substance is so spoken of in three ways, as we have said, and of these cases one is form, another matter, and the third the product of the two; and of these, matter is potentiality and form actuality. And since the product of the two is an ensouled thing, the body is not the actuality of soul, but the latter is the actuality of a certain kind of body. And for this reason those have the right conception who believe that the soul does not exist without a body and yet is not itself a kind of body. For it is not a body, but something which belongs to a body, and for this reason exists in a body, and a body of such and such a kind." (Aristotle, De anima, books II and III, translated with introduction and notes by D.W. Hamlyn, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 13 –14)

In his study of the soul Aristotle treats the principle of life, i.e. the power of material self-movement, or a material movement from within. Contrary to Hegel, for whom - as we will see below, - the soul is a concept (a Notion), when Aristotle speaks of the soul he does not mean merely the principle of thought; he means the principle of life. He defines the soul as the form, the complete actualisation, or realisation of the body, "the first entelechy of the organized body possessing the power of life." He distinguishes three kinds of souls: (a). The lowest nutritive or vegetative souls, which simply possess the principle of life: nutrition, repair, and reproduction - the pure biological life shared by all living things. (b). Sensitive or animal souls. Not only do they possess the principle of life, but they also possess desire and motion, which are the source of their sensitive faculties. It is

their sensations (senses, impulses, instincts), which separate animal life from plant life. (c). Thinking or rational souls. The highest level of life possesses reason or intellect, i.e. the power of acquiring universal and intellectual knowledge, in addition to all the faculties of the lower souls. This level is found in human beings alone. Yet, the fact remains that, for Aristotle, thought is based on the volitional active powers of impulse and desire which lead to and determine human actions.

Aristotle distinguishes the volitional active powers (which refer to the capacities of appetite and impulse as well as wish and desire) from the intellectual powers, which involve the capacities of conceiving and reasoning. But for Aristotle, it is not Will that obeys reason. For him, it is the other way round ; it is mind, "which calculates means to an end, i.e. mind practical (it differs from mind speculative in the character of its end)." (Aristotle, *On the Soul*, Translated by J. A. Smith, book III, chapter 10) Aristotle does not yet say explicitly - as we say now, - that reason is only the cognised itself will, that Will cognises itself and obeys only itself and is the master of itself. It is not yet the principle of his philosophy. Without question, he attains to the thinking itself thought as well as the primacy of appetite (wish, desire) over practical and speculative (theoretical) mind.

Nonetheless, his philosophy is not yet a systematic one. True, we can read in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that "There must, then, be something else that decides; I mean by this, desire or will. For whichever of two things the animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is present, and meets the passive object, in the way appropriate to the potency in question. Therefore everything which has a rational potency, when it desires that for which it has a potency and in the circumstances in which it has the potency, must do this." (*Metaphysics*, Translated by W. D. Ross, Book IX, part 5) He is aware of the Absolute Will; yet, neither the thought of thought, nor the practical Will are the principles of his philosophy. Notwithstanding the fact that his philosophy is both voluntarist and intellectual, he fails to intercombine and unite these two principles of the Absolute. Nonetheless, for millennia Aristotle has inspired great philosophers

whose philosophies belonged to either voluntarism or intellectualism; and, the fact remains that he certainly was the first rational (intellectual) voluntarist.

Aristotle did express the objective material Will in nature. Hegel, however, failed to attain to the principle of objective substantial Will at all. As I wrote in my book *On the Absolute Rational Will*: "Here a new moment emerges in philosophy, which Hegel completely fails to notice or rather keeps silent about. Although he asserts that "if we would be serious with Philosophy, nothing would be more desirable than to lecture upon Aristotle, for he is of all the ancients the most deserving of study,"(6) Hegel, who gives Plato's *Republic* so many pages of print in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, gives Aristotle's ethical works and his *Politics* just a few pages. It cannot be an act of pure accident. Hegel must have had good reasons not to do that. He arrives at Aristotle's thought of thought, he proclaims the latter to be the highest summit of Aristotle's philosophy, the most speculative that can exist; he approves all Aristotle's ideas which are in harmony with the principle "Cognise yourself", but when Aristotle goes beyond the bounds of this principle, Hegel does not want to and cannot follow him. Notwithstanding his fearless will to scientific cognition of truth, he abides by himself and his principle "Cognise yourself". However, "Cognise yourself" does not constitute the totality of the truly higher principle of the absolute, and consequently, it cannot express the whole infinite wealth of the latter."

(<http://www.jgora.dialog.net.pl/OnTheAbsoluteRationalWill/Aristotle'sConceptOfWill.htm>)

So, the question we have to answer now is:

### **Why is Hegel's treatment of Aristotle's philosophy defective?**

It is worth undertaking a scrupulous examination of both Hegel's philosophical method and his system if we want to know what we can achieve within his great philosophy. True, as Hegel claims, Philosophy is a system in development. In the introduction of his *Lectures on the history of philosophy* Hegel tells us what the business of logical philosophy is as well as what the method of the latter is: "But in order to obtain a knowledge of its progress as the development of the Idea in the empirical, external form in which

Philosophy appears in History, a corresponding knowledge of the Idea is absolutely essential, just as in judging of human affairs one must have a conception of that which is right and fitting. Else, indeed, as in so many histories of Philosophy, there is presented to the vision devoid of idea, only a disarranged collection of opinions. To make you acquainted with this Idea, and consequently to explain the manifestations, is the business of the history of Philosophy, and to do this is my object in undertaking to lecture on the subject." For Hegel it cannot be otherwise; the Absolute Spirit - the highest apex of his only cognitive philosophy, - cognises the Idea as its in-and-for-itself absolute truth, as the infinite Idea in which cognition and action are equalised, and which is the absolute knowledge of itself. "It is shown from what has been said regarding the formal nature of the Idea, that only a history of Philosophy thus regarded as a system of development in Idea, is entitled to the name of Science : a collection of facts constitutes no science." For Hegel, "the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth." (*The Science of Logic*) Here we are told what we can expect to learn from Hegel's history of philosophy. Hegel says it explicitly and it is essential to remember that Hegel's philosophy is an intellectual one - his task is to show us the history of philosophy as a system of the development of the Idea and nothing more but the Idea ; nothing else can we expect from the greatest rational philosopher ever.

No wonder that - as I have shown in chapter II. *On the Absolute Material Entelechy* of the book, - abiding by the principle of each intellectualistic philosophy "Cognise thyself," in his examination of Aristotle's work *On the soul*, Hegel presents us a Hegelianised Aristotelian philosophy. Consequently examining *On the soul*, Hegel does not go beyond chapter 7 of the third book. Further, in the following chapters of the third book Aristotle expresses completely different ideas, for which neither was there any place in Hegel's philosophical organisation of the absolute nor was Hegel interested in them. What we have to do now is to undertake a thorough examination of Aristotle's ideas. Without any doubt Aristotle's comprehension of the entelechy is out-of-date but true and nothing else in the world of philosophy can be more challenging and great than following Aristotle's lead. We have to

develop this category, to revive it, so as to outweigh and make up for the objective idealism, which developed the concept of the idea and neglected the Absolute Material Entelechy in the course of more than 2500 years. To put the concept of entelechy in conformity with the achievements of modern natural history, in conformity with our current knowledge of the laws of the absolute, is the task of our time and this magnificent work of the rational will is to be done. This is the road to the kingdom of absolute entelechy; Hegel failed to discover it.

In this chapter I am going to examine profoundly the question why Hegel's treatment of Aristotle's philosophy is flawed. Let us elaborate upon it with all the seriousness it deserves. Hegel acknowledges that Aristotle's philosophy is definitely not a pure intellectual one, that for Aristotle thought "is an object, like other objects, a kind of condition which he separates from the other conditions of the soul which he understands empirically, such as sleep, or weariness. He does not say that it alone is truth, that all is summed up in Thought, but he says it is the first, the strongest, and the most honourable." And Hegel goes on to express the contrast between his and Aristotle's philosophies; the only difference he can see is the way of speaking: "We, on the other hand, say that Thought, as that which relates to itself, has existence, or is the truth; that Thought comprehends the whole of Truth... Thus, although Aristotle does not express himself in modern philosophic language, he has yet throughout the same fundamental theory; he speaks not of a special kind of reason, but of the universal Reason. The speculative philosophy of Aristotle simply means the direction of thought on all kinds of objects, thus transforming these into thoughts; hence, in being thoughts, they exist in truth. The meaning of this is not, however, that natural objects have thus themselves the power of thinking, but as they are subjectively thought by me, my thought is thus also the Notion of the thing, which therefore constitutes its absolute substance. But in Nature the Notion does not exist explicitly as thought in this freedom, but has flesh and blood, and is oppressed by externalities; yet this flesh and blood has a soul, and this is the Notion." (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, volume 2, *Plato and the Platonists*, translated by E. S.

Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 149, 150)

Unfortunately for Hegel, there is infinitely more to be found in Aristotle than a pure intellectualistic philosophy. While it is true that Aristotle omits to unite intellectualism and voluntarism, the fact remains that his philosophy is both voluntaristic and intellectualistic. But Hegel does not take in consideration none of the voluntarist philosophies. He omits to notice them. He doesn't examine substantially the philosophies of Scotus Duns, William of Ockham and many other voluntarists. He doesn't mention at all that Fichte, Shelling and Schopenhauer develop the philosophy of voluntarism ; each of them in their own way. Hegel ignores voluntarism as the latter goes beyond the principle of each intellectualistic - and therefore, only cognitive - philosophy. He is a rational philosopher only and nothing more; he failed to become a rational voluntarist.

That is why the way Hegel treats Aristotle's philosophy is characteristic of Hegel's philosophical method and deserves to be closely examined. True, Hegel - to whom idealism is the deepest kind of speculation, - acknowledges that Aristotle excels Plato in speculative depth and the fact that Aristotle is of all the ancient philosophers the most deserving of study. At the very beginning of his chapter on Aristotle in volume two of his "Lectures on the history of philosophy," Hegel fears "that it behooves to enter even more into detail, since he was one of the richest and deepest of all the scientific geniuses that have as yet appeared - a man whose like no later age has ever yet produced." But Hegel omits to examine Aristotle's philosophy meticulously and as thoroughly as it deserves. He goes on to say that: "Unfortunately, however, I cannot give to Aristotle the amount of attention that he deserves. For we shall have to confine ourselves to a general view of his philosophy, and simply remark on the one particular phase of it, viz. in how far Aristotle in his philosophy carried out what in the Platonic principle had been begun, both in reference to the profundity of the ideas there contained, and to their expansion ; no one is more comprehensive and speculative than he, although his methods are not systematic." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, volume 2, Plato and the Platonists, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H.

Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 117) Here we have the secret of Hegel's philosophy revealed by Hegel himself; first and foremost he is interested in the idealism of Plato's intellectualistic philosophy. Hegel states overtly that he does not aim at presenting a balanced and thorough commentary of Aristotle's philosophy; he points out that he wants to emphasise only one particular aspect of Aristotle's philosophy - he is only interested "in how far Aristotle in his philosophy carried out what in the Platonic principle had been begun, both in reference to the profundity of the ideas there contained, and to their expansion." Hegel has sufficient reason not to examine Aristotle's philosophy as profoundly as Plato's one; Hegel is above all a rational philosopher, while Aristotle is definitely not only a rational philosopher. We can only regret that Hegel failed to elaborate upon Aristotle's philosophy and pay to it all the attention it deserves.

Without question, Hegel is disappointed that "In the Aristotelian teaching the Idea of the self-reflecting thought is thus grasped as the highest truth; but its realisation, the knowledge of the natural and spiritual universe, constitutes outside of the Idea long series of particular conceptions, which are external to one another, and in which a unifying principle, led through the particular, is wanting. The highest Idea with Aristotle consequently once more stands only as a particular in its own place and without being the principle of his whole philosophy. Hence the next necessity in Philosophy is that the whole extent of what is known must appear as one organisation of the Notion ; that in this way the manifold reality may be related to that Idea as the universal, and thereby determined. This is the the standpoint which we find in this second period." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, volume 2, Plato and the Platonists, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 117)

For Hegel, it is the movement of the logical Idea, which determines itself towards its further development and develops into nature and Spirit. Hegel would have appreciated it if Aristotle's philosophy was a pure rational philosophy. He regrets that in Aristotelian philosophy "there certainly is one

principle brought forward, and it is a speculative one, though it is not brought forward as being one. The nature of the speculative has not been explicitly brought to consciousness as the Notion - as containing in itself the development of the manifold nature of the natural and spiritual universe, consequently it is not set forth as the universal, from which the particular was developed." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, volume 2, Plato and the Platonists, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 229) This is what Hegel wants to attain to and he unavoidably attains to ; Hegel is only a rational philosopher. He is not a rational voluntarist. For the philosopher who is busied with the development of the principle of each intellectual philosophy "Cognise yourself," there is nothing else to achieve but the Notion, and the final result cannot be anything else but the Absolute as Spirit. The result is the developed beginning. Hegel is preoccupied with the thinking itself thought. He is absolutely right when he speaks about objective thinking, about objective material thoughts, but he fails to examine them as volitions of the Absolute Material Entelechy ; he does not aim yet at examining the objective Will as profoundly as it deserves.. He fails to come to the truly higher principle of the world that the Material Rational Will is the soul - the governing universal principle, - of the World.

For millennia the immense influence of intellectualistic (rational) philosophers has been so powerful that Soul has been connected with categories - such as mind, spirit, thought, consciousness, concept (Notion), - denoting the mental and intellectual aspect of man that the idealists tended to favour. The philosophy of Absolute Rational Will, by contrast, wills to study not only some favoured aspect of man, but man as such, man as a whole material-entelechiial entity, as a whole biological, acting, volitional, possessing itself entity and, therefore, as a being willing to think its own Absolute Rational Will, to achieve the highest end of the latter and come to its complete self-possession. There is no doubt that Hegel acknowledges the material side of the Absolute. The problem is that he does not examine it at all. He examines only the ideal side. Developing Aristotle's forms, Hegel talks about potency (in-itself) and actuality (for-itself), he examines how they exist for the cognition, not per se, i. e. how the Absolute possesses itself. Hegel's

philosophy is only a cognitive philosophy. Everywhere in his works he writes about being - the being in itself, the being for itself, the being in-and-for-itself, i.e. he examines the Absolute from the point of view of the cognising spirit only. He does not treat the absolute per se as it **has** itself in-and-for-itself.

In the end of the presentation of Aristotelian philosophy in his history of philosophy Hegel sums up his understanding of Aristotle's philosophy. There he once again presents his version of Hegelianised Aristotelian philosophy and not only does he demonstrate his final sin but all his sins at once. There is no space, no word for the voluntarist part of Aristotle's philosophy as if Aristotle had never written about the Will and in spite of the fact that so many philosophers who developed Voluntarism as well as numerous other who developed Intellectualism, - such as Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and many others, who wrote about Will from an intellectualistic point of view, - were inspired by Aristotle's philosophy of Will. Hegel says: "Here we have concluded the first division of Greek philosophy, and we have now to pass to the second period. The first period of Greek philosophy extended to Aristotle, to the attainment of a scientific form in which knowledge has reached the standing of free thought... Thus in Plato and Aristotle the result was the Idea; yet we saw in Plato the universal made the principle in a somewhat abstract way as the unmoved Idea; in Aristotle, on the other hand, thought in activity became absolutely concrete as the thought which thinks itself."

Hegel, for whom the purpose of philosophy has always been the intellectualistic (rational) cognition of the ideal side of the Absolute, goes on to say: "The next essential, one which now is immediately before us, must be contained in that into which Philosophy under Plato and Aristotle had formed itself. This necessity is none other than the fact that the Universal must now be proclaimed free for itself as the universality of the principle, so that the particular may be recognised through this universal; or the necessity of a systematic philosophy immediately enters in, what we formerly called one in accordance with the unity of the Notion. We may speak of the Platonic and

Aristotelian systems, but they are not in the form of a system; for that it is requisite that one principle should be maintained and consistently carried through the particular." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, volume 2, Plato and the Platonists, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, p.228-229) Hegel recognises only systematic intellectualistic philosophy and wills to develop the latter in accordance with the unity of the Notion.

Unquestionably, he failed to attain to the standpoint that only a genuine voluntaristic philosophy can be the necessary development of the principle of Intellectualism since the latter is only a moment of the supreme principle of the Absolute "Will yourself," which develops itself from-and-through itself. Hegel does not yet speak so. Nevertheless, what he calls material determinations of thinking is nothing else but God's Will. Substantially God's Will and God's Reason are one and the same; they are indivisible. Each philosophy which divides them is doomed to become dogmatic and one-sided.

## **ANAXAGORAS**

At this point let us carry out a scrupulous examination of where exactly in his History of philosophy and how Hegel introduces his concept (Notion). And the essential point is that Hegel's concept (Notion) is the idea of the good. The first time Hegel talks about the good is when he starts treating Empedocles. Hegel says: "Aristotle shows the trace of universality present here; for to him it may be termed essential in dealing with the Notion of the principle, that which is in and for itself. But this is only the Notion or the thought which is present in and for itself; we have not yet seen such a principle, for we find it first in Anaxagoras. If Aristotle found the principle of motion missed in ancient philosophers, in the Becoming of Heraclites, he again missed in Heraclites the still deeper principle of the Good, and hence wished to discover it in Empedocles. By the good the "why" is to be understood, that which is an end in and for itself, which is clearly established in itself, which is on its own account, and through which all else is ; the end

has the determination of activity, the bringing forth of itself, so that it, as end to itself, is the Idea, the Notion that makes itself objective and, in its objectivity, is identical with itself. Aristotle thus controverts Heraclites, because his principle is change alone, without remaining like self, maintaining self, and going back within self." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane, in three volumes, Volume 1, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, p. 316, 317)

Now we see that here, in Anaxagoras, Aristotle finds the good (as the directed towards itself end) explicitly expressed. This is a great moment. It is wonderful to see philosophy in action, to see great philosophers altogether trying to answer and develop the greatest philosophical question. It is a mini-universe in which the philosophies of the ancient materialists, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Aristotle and Hegel meet together. However, none of them comes to the Absolute as Volition. Hegel says that the end is the Notion which self-determines itself. So he expresses the end (the Good) as the true which still has in itself the determinations of the self-realising activity, of the end in-and-for-itself, i.e. according to Hegel the end (the directed towards itself Good) has in itself the determinations of the Notion, which is in itself and for itself. No one has ever expressed the ideal side of the Absolute better than Hegel ; yet, Hegel's Absolute still lacks something infinitely essential - it lacks the material volition, the volition of the Absolute Material Entelechy. Thus, in Hegel's philosophy we see perfectly expressed the Absolute Notion without its other - the Absolute Material Volition. It is amazing that Hegel cognises the one without its other, for he is the philosopher who has taught mankind to think speculatively. He has taught us that the infinite, the being in and for itself is an unity of opposite determinations so that speculative Reason cognises the one in its other; it cognises that each of the opposites contains its own other in itself since they are only moments of the omnipotent Absolute, which unites them in itself and has them in its own one-and-the-sameness.

Hegel examines the end only through the categories of cognitive philosophy and determines the end as the Idea, thought, the Notion, the spirit., in a word, not as Volition: "I have just recently (p. 316) spoken of the Notion of the end, yet by that we must not merely think of the form of the end

as it is in us, in conscious beings... But we must not, as we usually do, abide at the conception of this subjective end; in this case both I and the end exist independently and externally to each other. In the conception that God, as wisdom rules the world in accordance with an end, for instance, the end is posited for itself in a wise, figuratively conceiving Being. But the universal of end is the fact that since it is a determination independently fixed, that rules present existence, the end is the truth, the soul of a thing. The Good in the end gives contents to itself, so that while it is active with this content, and after it has entered into externality, no other content comes forth than what was already present. The best example of this is presented in life; it has desires, and these desires are its ends; as merely living, however, it knows nothing of these ends, but yet they are first, immediate determinations which are established. The animal works at satisfying these desires, i.e. at reaching the end; it relates itself to external things, partly mechanically, partly chemically. .... Self-preservation is a continual production by which nothing new, but always the old, arises; it is a taking back of activity for the production of itself." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane, in three volumes, Volume 1, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, p. 332, 333)

Aristotle and Hegel define the absolutely self-preserving substance, the being in-and-for-itself as end in itself, the good. For Hegel, the latter is soul but neither he nor Aristotle goes further and examines the Good. No wonder that according to Hegel with Anaxagoras a light begins to dawn because in his philosophy Anaxagoras recognizes the reason ( $\zeta$ ) $\nu\omicron\upsilon$  as the principle of the world: "The logical principle of Anaxagoras was that he recognised the  $\zeta$  $\nu\omicron\upsilon$  (nous) as the the simple, absolute essence of the world... but the comprehension of the Notion itself is certainly not found with the ancients. We need not expect a pure Notion such as one of an understanding realizing itself into a system, organized as a universe. ... How Anaxagoras enunciated the Notion of the  $\zeta$  $\nu\omicron\upsilon$  (nous), Aristotle (De anima, I, 2) goes on to tell: "Anaxagoras maintains that the soul is the principle of movement. Yet he does not always express himself fully about the soul and  $\zeta$  $\nu\omicron\upsilon$  (nous): he seems to separate  $\zeta$  $\nu\omicron\upsilon$  (nous) and soul from one another, and still he makes use of them as though they were the same existence, only that by preference he

makes the ζνοῦ (nous) the principle of everything. He certainly speaks frequently of the ζνοῦ (nous) as of the cause of the beautiful and right, but another time he calls it the soul." What we therefore have to do is to show from the principle of motion, that it is self-moving; and this thought is, as existent for itself. As soul, the self-moving is immediately individual, the ζνοῦ (nous), however, as simple, is the universal." (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane, in three volumes, Volume 1, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, p. 329, 330)

The end (the directed towards itself Good) does not have to be comprehended as Reason (νοῦ)ζ only - as Anaxagoras does and each rational philosophy does, but first and foremost as Volition. Hegel does not talk about Volition; he is not a rational voluntarist. Treating only the ideal side of the Absolute, he usually talks about the ideal side - the end (the Good) without the matter as if Volition can be immaterial. Thus, although Hegel recognises the conception of ends as an organising factor of Aristotle's complete reality, he interprets the world as rational or logical only.

## ARISTOTLE

LET US EXAMINE THE CONCEPT FURTHER: In his *Metaphysics*, Book 1, Part 2 Aristotle says: "And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. ... this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end is one of the causes." The good (The Notion as Hegel says) in Anaxagoras's philosophy and in Aristotle's one is just the same. Aristotle treats the good, examines it. Yet, he fails to attain to the point to introduce explicitly the principle of volition. It looks as if he needed to make just a step to the principle of Will, but he never makes this step. He defines the willed - the good, - he cognises it as the absolute but he fails to say that Will towards the good is the truly absolute, that man as a willing and

thinking material being, as a living manifestation of the Absolute Rational Will, is the absolute measure of all things.

As for Hegel, he omitted to achieve the knowledge that the Absolute is self-willing Rational Will. Thus, the knowledge that the Absolute is self-willing and - therefore, - self-thinking Will is not old. Now the World Will performs once again what Aristotle did in Ancient Greece. It comes back from the spheres of pure thoughts and acknowledges the primacy of the practical universal law over the pure (contemplations of theoretical) Reason. It is now that the world attains to the principle "Cognise and possess yourself," i.e. to the realm of infinite conscious will and this principle is the highest principle, the highest development of the Absolute Rational Will. The Will strives to possess itself in its totality and cognises itself, attains to the true as cognised Will (i.e. Will is the essential moment, the principle of the true) and, in so doing, the Absolute Rational Will achieves its highest good - its Freedom. Freedom consists in possessing itself; anything whatsoever which does not possess itself is lifeless and inanimate.

In book 1, part 2 of his *Metaphysics* Aristotle says: "And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences; and this end is the good of the thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. ... this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes." Aristotle also claims that "the end is the good in Nature." Nonetheless, *Volition* - not the good, - is the central or supreme category of a philosophy that deals with the Absolute Rational Will, and Volition cannot be sacrificed to the Good. It is exactly the Good as the directed towards itself End that we call material Volition. Hegel cannot but call the Good a Notion since he treats only the ideal side of the Absolute; no wonder that neither Aristotle nor Hegel attains to the standpoint of the principle of Volition, of the primal Rational Will. However, it is the pure Rational Will that is the completely true as well as the absolutely material-entelechiial; Material Entelechy is definitely one of the most important categories of Science of Philosophy today.

Aristotle failed to express the directed to itself end (purpose) as Volition. Volition is that which is in power over itself in its self-possession. Volition is the true content, the soul of something given. It wills (strives) to enter in possession of its contents, to preserve and have itself in it. The Absolute Rational Will of the absolute material entelechy is the self-moving principle of the world, of the organic system of the whole, because it and it alone is what exists for itself, possesses itself for itself and rules itself. Self-possession is the continuous being in power over itself. The Material Rational Will and it alone is what exists for itself and possesses itself for itself; it wills to have itself for itself as it is its own highest good. The Absolute Material Entelechy manifests the universal and irresistible Power of its Rational Will in-and-through its absolute law before which nothing can stand up against. Will wills to have itself for itself as it is its own highest good and to be free in itself. Freedom consists only in self-possessing; that which does not possess itself is lifeless. In its complete reality material entelechy is the end that achieves its complete realisation, i.e. it is Will - a material volition, which in-and-through itself organises (Hegel would say "determines") itself. Thus, it is the Willing, which enters in possession of itself. The ends of the material entelechy are ends of the absolute willing, which exists for itself alone so that everything else exists only through it (the absolute willing). The material rational will is the principle of the absolute (of nature).

Aristotle is right when he defines the entelechy as an end (aim) in itself and the realisation of the end but what he still does not attain to is the standpoint that the Absolute Material Entelechy has its ends and manifests them as laws of the its Absolute Volition, i.e. of the Absolute Rational Will. Aristotle says that matter itself is only potency, but not an actuality, that the form is actuality and matter is the passive substratum of the form. According to Aristotle matter has true being only through the absolute form, energy, i.e. as a referring to itself negativity. We regard Entelechy as totally material. Entelechy should be treated not as "self-fulfillment" but as "entering into self-possession." Thus we express thoroughly the immanent End of the absolute. The rational will of the absolute material entelechy illimitably possesses both moments - matter and entelechy, - in their absolute unity, in

which they are one and the same so that either of them is unthinkable and impossible to be possessed without its other and matter is as much entelechial as entelechy is material. Matter and entelechy are inalienable moments of the self-possessing absolute, whose absolute will cannot be disposed of them by nothing else as it and it alone is the absolute sovereign of the world. This is the reason that, as far as the practical is concerned, the absolute actual matter or the absolute material actuality (εντελεχεια) in the living process of its concrete development is the true way of examining the absolute.

True, Aristotle still does not attain to is the standpoint that Entelechy is manifestation of the ends of the Absolute Volition, i.e. of the Absolute Rational Will. Both Aristotle and Hegel define the absolutely self-preserving substance, the being in-and-for-itself as end in itself, the good. Neither of them do not go further and examine the good. The latter is soul; for Hegel, the principle of philosophy is the infinite free Notion and its whole content is based only on the latter. According to him the Notion is soul in the guise of an immediate living objectivity as such of the individual, since it is ensouled by the Notion and has the Notion for its substance. Thus, for Hegel, in the first place life is *soul*, as the Notion of itself that is completely determined within itself and is the initiating, self-moving principle; the notion of life is the soul, and this notion has the body for its reality. Hegel fails to introduce the objective Will, which has the end (the volition), in itself and insuperably strives (desires) to realise and realises its end as the complete reality of the World. True, he speaks about the urge of the Notion to realise itself *for itself*, however what he does not yet express is that this urge is nothing else but the Volition of the Absolute Rational Will, which has the Volition and the Notion as its immanent moments, sublates them and maintains them in its absolute unity.

In the preface of his *Phenomenology of Mind* Hegel says: "The result is the same as the beginning solely because the beginning is purpose. Stated otherwise, what is actual and concrete is the same as its INNER PRINCIPLE or notion simply because the immediate qua purpose contains within it the self or pure actuality. The realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement

and development unfolded." The deficiency of Hegel's method is that he treats the Absolute Rational Will one-sidedly and does not go further than the Notion ; it is the latter that according to him is the self-moving principle of the Absolute. Hegel fails to introduce the objective Will, which has its ends (its rational volitions), in itself and insuperably strives (desires) to realise and realises them.

## **SUBLATION OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY**

It is important to say that if so many great philosophers failed to sublate Hegel's philosophy, it is only because they failed to find the immanent higher principle of the Absolute, which (principle) can only be obtained as the result of the own dialectical development of Hegel's philosophical system. Hegel - definitely one of the greatest teachers of mankind, - taught us that if we want to refute a previous philosophy and in so doing to find the latest and the newest development of the immanent higher principle of the Absolute, we cannot do it from "outside" by arbitrary arguments but through unfolding and developing its own immanent and internal contradictions, which it is not yet aware about. This exactly is the way - the infinitely powerful method of highly scientific Hegelian speculative philosophy, - the Philosophy of the Absolute Rational Will follows to sublate Hegel's objective idealism and due to the method of the latter successfully sublates it.

The defect (the deficiency) of Hegel's has to be revealed through the dialectical development of his philosophical system. Thus and only thus, the principle of his philosophical system can be refuted. I have already expressed many times the lack of the principle of Will in Hegel's philosophy. Like Aristotle, Hegel fails to interweave the end (the purpose) and Will. What Hegel fails to say is that it is Volition that posits itself an end; this end is the good. In Hegel's philosophy firstly the end is without volition, and secondly, the absolute end is Reason; that is why Hegel calls the end a concept (a Notion). Hegel is absolutely right to say that Aristotle noticed the lack of the principle of

Good in Heraclitus' philosophy; we notice the lack of the principle of Will in Aristotle's as well as in Hegel's philosophy.

Hegel failed to grasp the Power of Thinking Material Will as absolute essence, that it is volition that sets itself an end; the good is this end. In Hegel's philosophy the end is without volition; Hegel calls the end a Notion. Generally speaking, we notice the lack of the principle of Will in Hegel's philosophy. It is not End but Volition that is the true contents, the soul of a given thing. Volition enters in-and-through itself into possession of its own content, preserves itself and has itself in its freedom. The principle of philosophy is the infinite free rational volition. In his only cognitive and, therefore, only rational philosophy, Hegel does not speak so. He willed to develop and did develop a philosophical system able to express perfectly the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well ; in the preface of his "Phenomenology of Spirit" he says: "In my view - a view which the developed exposition of the system itself can alone justify, - everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well." He repeats that point in §213 of his Encyclopaedia: "The Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other, any more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion. The Absolute is the universal and one idea, which, by an act of 'judgement', particularises itself to the system of specific ideas; which after all are constrained by their nature to come back to the one idea where their truth lies. As issued out of this 'judgement' the Idea is in the first place only the one universal substance: but its developed and genuine actuality is to be as a subject and in that way as mind." It is certainly one of Hegel's finest and greatest contributions to the Science of Philosophy.

Nonetheless, we see that first and foremost Hegel treats the subject as a thinking mind, that Hegel is keen on expressing the material will (the good) as the true. Today we want to determine the Absolute further as willing and thinking material subject. Unquestionably, the absolute is subject, Hegel is absolutely right, but what he failed to say was to treat the absolute as a MATERIAL WILLING AND THINKING SUBJECT. The end of subjective thinking as well as practical activity is the good of the material willing (and,

therefore, thinking) subject. The principle of individuation is one of the moments of the "Cognise and possess yourself" universal principle. This material and willing subject moves and lives in its own property ; it wills to know itself with no other reason but to enter in absolute and complete possession of itself.

Hegel did not aim at the Science of Will. He did not examine it in a systematic way, so as to develop the principle of the Will. This is exactly the point. Hegel does not take into consideration the material rational volition. He is right to say that without thinking there could not be any Will, but it is also true that without material volition does not exist any thinking consciousness. Volition and Concept (Notion) are the two opposite moments of the strongest contradiction of the Absolute, which the latter in its infinite elasticity unites and combines and has them as moments of its Absolute Material-Rational Will. This is the *internal contradiction* which Hegel *is not aware about*. To cut a long story short, I would like to say that in my book and now in this further development of the Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will, I have aimed at revealing the inner dialectics of the principle of each intellectualistic philosophy - "Cognise yourself," - which in and through itself overcomes itself to its true form in which it is only a moment of a higher principle - the principle of Absolute Rational Will "Will yourself." The latter contains in itself as sublated all the previous determinations of Hegel's philosophy, which in turn is the developed result of the whole history of rational Philosophy. Thus, the Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will affirmatively inherits and contains in itself the great legacy of Hegel's philosophy, enters in total possession of it and uses the wealth of its content as its own, because it (the Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will) is the necessary development of the Science of Philosophy today.

But it means that a critical study of Hegel is bound to show the good and its logical equivalent - the Notion, - as sublated by Volition. The task of our time is to elaborate upon Volition much better than it has ever been done before and express its materiality properly. Volition is the category through which the Absolute unites idealism and materialism better. Materialism and

idealism are to be united - it is exactly the principle of the Absolute Rational Will "Cognise and possess yourself" that unites the principles of materialism and idealism and sublates both them, so that for the time being it and only it is their higher truth. The presumption that true philosophy can be only idealist is wrong. It wasn't an accident that the first philosophers were materialists. In its highest apex a true (i.e. speculative) idealistic philosophy becomes a completed totality and comes into its own Other (i.e. it becomes materialistic as well) and this is exactly the case with a true speculative materialistic philosophy (which inevitably also comes into its own Other and becomes idealistic as well; but it is valid for a true speculative materialistic philosophy only).

Hegel's philosophy deserves to be sublated, i.e. to be preserved its absolutely true content, which unquestionably belongs to the Absolute Truth, but is still not the final and absolute content of the latter, and therefore with absolute necessity has to be developed to a higher level of its self-development. Beyond question, it is the Absolute that in its immanent speculative dialectics manifests its infinite volition to develop itself further and actually develops itself. There is no proposition of Hegel which does not deserve to belong to the Philosophy of the Absolute Rational Will for only a philosophy that is capable of sublating a previous philosophy is actually a genuine development of the Science of Philosophy. The latest actual philosophy which sublates Hegel's philosophy is bound to preserve and preserves the whole content of that great philosophy and develops it.

## **Voluntarism**

**[or Why did Hegel fail to become a rational voluntarist?]**

Why is Hegel's philosophy only an intellectualistic (rational) one? The amazing thing is that once Hegel came to the Absolute Spirit and the thinking itself thought, Hegel had answered all his philosophical questions. In the end

of his final chapter 4 on Aristotelian philosophy titled "The Logic," Hegel sums up his understanding of Aristotle's philosophy. As I have already mentioned above, there he once again tells us his version of Hegelianised Aristotelian philosophy and not only does he demonstrate his final sin but all his sins at once. There is no space, no word for the voluntarist part of Aristotle's philosophy as if Aristotle had never written about the Will and in spite of the fact that so many philosophers who developed Voluntarism and numerous other who developed Intellectualism were tremendously inspired by Aristotle's philosophy of Will.

True, the Will is genuinely free, absolutely free, only as thinking itself Will. But the defect of Hegel's philosophy is that for him, the Absolute is only Spirit. In the very beginning of his philosophising, in his youth, Hegel answers all his philosophical questions, attains to the idea that the Absolute is Spirit and its thinking itself thought, deals with the Science of Logic and applies the categories of the latter everywhere else in his philosophical works.

As a matter of fact, neither Aristotle nor Hegel do not premise and do not attain to the idea that the actual matter or the material actuality, - which we call material entelechy, - is absolutely creative and capable of self-development, and possesses its self-forming principle in-and-for-itself. They do not arrive at the principle of vitality of the matter, of the self-organizing matter. Hegel correctly asserts that, in the general and in the whole, what philosophy claims has to be in conformity with the points of view of the public at large, but all the more philosophy has to be in conformity with the facts of natural history. Hegel's Idea is the true as such. It is utterly simple and immaterial; Hegel disregards the material aspect of the absolute. He examines only the pure actuality, the pure entelechy without its immanent material nature.

According to Hegel, the Absolute is Spirit; this is the highest determination of the Absolute. No wonder that the highest good for Hegel's Spirit is to know itself as that which is something truly being and real ; thus, thought is identical with itself. Hegel - certainly the greatest rational philosopher, - stopped the development of his philosophical system at this

point ; he must have come to the conclusion that he had reconciled the desires and the questions of his fearless will for truth with the complete reality of the World. But in no way what was enough for Hegel is enough for the Absolute Rational Will. The latter wants to possess itself and only in-and-through the actual process of willing it comes to complete development of the Power of its own Volition, the result being that the absolute material entelechy has itself in its own movement and its own life.

In his philosophy, however, Hegel also expresses something absolutely great - the greatest possible content of philosophy, - the Good. He expresses the Absolute Good as Absolute Notion from the point of view of his only cognitive philosophy. The Absolute Notion is as much an infinitely immanent moment of the Absolute as the Absolute Good is. That is why his philosophy is scientific; it is a philosophy of the true. He failed to treat Will as an absolute principle of the material entelechy. There is abundant evidence that Hegel omitted to grasp the Will and its overpowering, overmastering domination as an immanent moment of the Absolute; a moment, which is as infinite and unconditional as Reason and its Absolute Notion. Yet, there is no proposition of Hegel which does not deserve to belong to the Philosophy of the Absolute Rational Will for only a philosophy that is capable of sublating a previous true philosophy is actually a genuine development of the Science of Philosophy. The latest actual philosophy which sublates Hegel's philosophy is bound to preserve and preserves the whole content of that great philosophy and develops it.

Brain is one of the organs of a naturally organised body, which is in possession of all its organs and their functions. In each step of its self-development, the absolute is on a certain stage of its power and is in possession of its power. In its highest developed form, man, it possesses itself totally and thanks to its brain - the thinking itself matter, the thinking itself absolute material entelechy, - it comes to its ideal form as Reason, Spirit. It cognises itself for it wills to come to its complete self-possession. (Enc., v. 1, p. 117) We set ourselves aims; we think over them and decide what means we need in order to achieve them. Thus, theoretical reason and practical reason

are only about the means, because the substantial objective Will is the governing universal aim (end). The task of practical Reason is to find the means and the tools to achieve, to attain to the complete reality of its purposes or ends. The primacy of the totally practical Rational Will over the pure Spirit is unquestionable in the philosophy of Absolute Rational Will. The latter uses its active powers - both volitional and intellectual, - to rule the World, i.e. to rule the very itself, to rule itself for itself.

True, - as Hegel says, - it was Heraclitus who expressed the nature of the infinite and realised the nature as infinite *per se*, i. e. realised its essence as process. Despite of the fact that Aristotle failed to attain to the principle of Will, there is no doubt that thanks to his categories *entelechy* and *potency*, Aristotle was the first to express philosophically the material processes of development of material will, which is a tremendous contribution to philosophy. As for Hegel, in the Introduction of his "Lectures on the history of philosophy" he also expresses Aristotle's idea of development from the point of view of rational - only cognitive, - philosophy. He says: "In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different states must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (*potentia*, δύμις); the second principle is that of being-for-itself (*actus*, ἐνέργεια)" (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane, in three volumes, Volume 1, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 21)

Here we see Hegel making a tremendous philosophical headway by introducing his great categories: *in-itself* and *for-itself*. And the amazing thing is that introducing them, Hegel does not suspect at all that he expresses something infinitely greater than determinations of the Absolute Idea - he is not aware yet that these two categories are determinations of the principle of Will "Possess yourself." Being a rational philosopher only, being the philosopher of Absolute Spirit, he fails to realise the infinite significance of two of the greatest categories of the principle of Absolute Rational Will. Hegel says that only the Notion or thought is what immediately is for itself in itself ; today we say that the absolute Notion is a moment of the the Absolute

Rational Will, which wills to possess itself totally. Hegel does not speak so yet. We can see that Hegel is not far away from the principle "Possess yourself," but he never makes that step. He fails to attain to the standpoint that it is the Will that reveals itself to itself through the Absolute Idea and its highest determination - the Absolute Spirit. It is the Will that reveals itself totally in the active powers of the world of nature as well as the deeds of Spirit. Hegel does not say yet - as we say today, - that the Universe is constituted by the eternal Rational Will, which rules, makes, and forms all things; in consciousness the Will enters in possession of its own Absolute form as the form of forms, i.e. it manifests itself as Absolute Spirit. What Hegel does not know yet is that the Will of the Absolute cannot stop at the standpoint of the Absolute Spirit. Its eternal power is desirous and able to produce the desired result in which the beginning and the end are identical. It wills to sublimate its own other - the Absolute Spirit, - and come to its total self-possession as Absolute Rational Will. Man is the complete realisation of the Absolute Rational Will as a self-possessing and, therefore, free individual ; freedom is the greatest possession of a living being.

As I wrote in volume 1 of the book: "It is remarkable that Hegel called Aristotle's categories *δυναμικς* (possibility, potentia) and *εντελεχεια* (entelechy, actuality) respectively in-itself and for-itself. It is true that he constantly makes the best use of them everywhere in his works (for example, he speaks about the being in itself, the being for itself, the in-and-for-itself existing notion); however, the fact remains that Hegel does not examine them... These great categories have to be explored further, to be examined thoroughly in order to develop the principle of his philosophy; for they go beyond that principle. In themselves they contain the necessary development of Hegel's principle "Cognise yourself." Hegel uses these categories - *in-itself* and *for-itself*, - continuously as categories of his speculative philosophy so as to reach the goal of his time. He uses them in the way he needs them; and he needs them only as categories of the self-cognising reason. Hegel is a stranger to the idea that these categories - and countless other, which he uses in his speculative logic time and again, - belong to the sphere of property, possession and ownership. They express the absolute will and its absolute right to possess,

use and dispose of itself, but Hegel does not yet know it. Whenever he regards the Absolute Idea and the Absolute Spirit in his logic, he uses all the possible categories that belong to the sphere of will and the determinate forms of its self-possession, such as the urge (and its desires, inclinations, purposes) to own, to possess property and many more. However, Hegel is not yet aware that this is neither accidental nor arbitrary, but the actual way the absolute enters in possession of itself; what is in itself must become for itself, i.e. must take possession of itself. All these categories are immanent aspects of the absolute; they are the manifestation of a higher principle of the absolute, but Hegel did not yet know it. According to him "The unity of thought with itself is freedom, the free will. Thought, as volition merely, is the impulse to abrogate one's subjectivity, the relation to present existence, the realizing of oneself, since in that I am endeavouring to place myself as existent on equality with myself as thinking. It is only as having the power of thought that the will is free."

[www.igora.dialog.net.pl/OnTheAbsoluteRationalWill/TheDefectOfHegel'sPhilosophy.htm](http://www.igora.dialog.net.pl/OnTheAbsoluteRationalWill/TheDefectOfHegel'sPhilosophy.htm)

Hegel fails to introduce the objective Will (volition), which has the end (goal) in itself and insuperably strives (desires) to realise and realises its end. In his rational philosophy he uses Aristotle's potency and the entelechy - he calls them in-itself and for it-self, respectively, - as important categories of his objective idealism. But it is essential to say that the realised Good as a concrete material individual has itself totally, possesses itself in itself, through itself and for itself. It has its own end as its beginning and is the realised end of the Absolute Material Entelechy.

It is absolutely true that - as Hegel says, - Spirit knows itself in Thought as something absolutely truly being and actual, that Thought is the identity of itself and the being. Unquestionably, it is absolutely true but only in willing does the Absolute Rational Will possess itself in its totality, i.e. in its material entelechiality. I am both a spiritual being and a material-entelechial being. I possess myself and I will to possess myself. The Absolute Material Entelechy

has in itself its own volition - its own movement and its own life, - i.e. Volition is the self-moving principle of the Absolute.

We see that the Volition of the Absolute Material Entelechy sets itself a goal (an end - as Aristotle and Hegel say because in the End the result is the beginning; the beginning and the end are identical. This End is the directed towards itself Good. This End has to be clearly defined - it is the entering in self-possession Absolute Rational Will, in which the beginning and the end are identical. For Hegel and all rational philosophers the end, the good, the soul are without Volition. That is why Hegel calls the Good (the End, the Soul) a Notion. He says that the universal of the End is the true content, the Soul of a individual. Hegel failed to attain to the standpoint of modern Rational Voluntarism that Volition is that which is in power over itself, is its own master in its self-possession. Abiding by "Cognise yourself" - the principle of each rational and, therefore, only cognitive philosophy Hegel had no chance to become a rational voluntarist.

It is Will that is itself and its other - Reason, - and contains them in its absolute unity. The Absolute material entelechy has its insuperable Will for universal Law and manifests its divine order in the Universe through its creations. Man belongs to the rational-volitional world of the Absolute and wills the Absolute Will - the will of its creator, - i.e. he wills to cognise itself and enter in possession of itself for itself. Thus man comes in possession of the Absolute Power - his inherent property, which is the source of his inherent and admitted right to rule and govern his own world. Only as organism possessing a brain - thinking matter, - the actual world thinks itself in-and-for-itself and uses its practical reason as the means through which the Will attains to its complete material entelechiality (to its complete reality) and possesses itself as complete Freedom, i.e. enters in possession of its absolute property - Freedom. Will gives itself its own contents - the good. It (Will) strives for the best solution in its self-development. It has the power over itself, the power to act and produce the best solution. The latter is definitely rational and in it Will realises its rational Volition, preserves itself and has itself in it. The

principle of the latest philosophy is the infinite free volition (the infinite Absolute Rational Will).

Modern Voluntarism cannot and should not be characterized as a philosophical view in which prominence is given to the Will over against Reason but as the Absolute Material Entelechy which has in itself its own Will (Volition), i.e. its own movement and its own life. This self-moving material principle is Volition; it is which moves itself on its own. In its complete reality material entelechy is the end that achieves its complete realisation, i.e. it is Will - a material volition, which in-and-through itself organises (Hegel would say "determines") itself. Thus, it is the Willing, which enters in possession of itself. The ends of the material entelechy are ends of the absolute willing, which exists for itself alone so that everything else exists only through it (the absolute willing). The material rational will is the principle of the absolute (of nature). As far as cognition is concerned, I should say that "Possess and cognise yourself" is the self-moving principle of the Absolute Rational Will ; it is the highest end, the ultimate self-purpose of the Absolute. In chapter "On the Absolute Rational Will" of the *Further development* I have already described the material that dematerialise itself in the process of cognition so that ***it cognises itself in order to enter in complete possession of itself***. This is the highest end, the supreme circle of the Absolute.

## **The Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will**

The Absolute is material rational Will - the principle of all things; it is something willing, desiring. Not the Good but Volition is more important in the Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will and it is precisely Volition that deserves to be examined meticulously. Its principle "Will yourself" rules the process of

individualisation, of total self-organisation. The Absolute Rational Will has itself - its highest Good, - only inasmuch as it is individualised, i.e. only inasmuch as it possesses itself. It is the subjective, the individual that possesses and rules itself. The Good is the highest manifestation, the end at which the Absolute Rational Will aims; the latter aims at the best, strives for the best in line with the present material actuality in each particular moment of its evolutionary or revolutionary development. Therefore, not the Good but the Volition of the Good is the truly Absolute, whose Absolute Will - and its law, - self-realizes in the world.

Unlike Aristotle, we regard the entelechy as totally material. The rational will of the absolute material entelechy illimitably possesses both moments - matter and entelechy, - in their absolute unity, in which they are one and the same so that either of them is unthinkable and impossible to be possessed without its other and matter is as much entelechial as entelechy is material. Matter and entelechy are inalienable moments of the self-possessing absolute, whose absolute will cannot be disposed of them by nothing else as it and it alone is the absolute sovereign of the world. This is the reason that, as far as the practical is concerned, the absolute actual matter or the absolute material actuality (εντελεχεια) in the living process of its concrete development is the true way of examining the Absolute.

Anyone who sublates Hegel is bound to find the defect of Hegel's system. But it is not individuals that are important when we talk about philosophies each of which sublates the previous one in the eternal process of the Absolute. It is the latter - and precisely speaking, - its Absolute Rational Will that in its self-development has the urge to go beyond Hegel's standpoint (at which the Absolute grasps itself as Absolute Spirit only). I do not say that Hegel forgets the material completely, but in his philosophy it is present only implicitly. It is high time the matter had its rights vindicated. The Absolute wills to possess itself in its totality and true right. It is modern Philosophy of the Absolute Rational Will that unites voluntarism and intellectualism in a unified voluntaristic-intellectualistic philosophy, because in themselves voluntarism and intellectualism are one and the same ; it is the Understanding

that divides them in two opposite and, therefore, dogmatic one-sided doctrines.

Hegel's reading of Aristotle is neither the best nor the only possible one. Hegel claims: "Ancient philosophy is to be revered as necessary, and as a link to this sacred chain, but all the same nothing more than a link. The present is the highest stage reached. In the second place, all the various philosophies are no mere fashionable theories of the time, or anything of a similar nature; they are neither chance products nor the blaze of a fire of straw, nor casual eruptions here and there, but a spiritual, reasonable, forward advance; they are of necessity one Philosophy in its development, the revelation of God, as He knows Himself to be." (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, volume 3, *Medieval and modern philosophy*, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 547) No wonder that according to the philosopher, who based the *Science of Philosophy* on the principle "Know yourself," the highest stage philosophy reached when he was alive, was "the revelation of God, as He knows Himself to be." Hegel expresses the divine Spirit as the self-knowing actual Idea; this is the voice, the expression, the manifestation of past millennia. But now the task of the new millennium is - and that is being developed in the philosophy of the Absolute Rational Will, - to reveal the Absolute, God, *as he has himself*.

In his *Science of Logic* Hegel claims that the Absolute Notion is "the innermost source of all activity of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between the Notion and reality, and the unity that is truth." In his philosophy - and generally speaking, in each rational or intellectualistic philosophy, in each form of objective idealism, - the Soul is determined by the categories of the thinking mind, of consciousness. It cannot be otherwise; his is only a cognitive philosophy and he is interested in the unity of the Notion and reality that is truth. Hegel claims that "The ultimate aim and business of philosophy is to reconcile or the Notion with reality." (Hegel, *Lectures on the History of*

Philosophy, volume 3, Medieval and modern philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 545)

But it is not the present standpoint of philosophy anymore. We say that the Volition of the Absolute Material Entelechy towards the Good is the Absolute Soul, and thus, the soul of an individualised and self-organised living being. Volition is the end (the purpose) of Material Entelechy, which is determined in-and-for-itself, self-organises itself and in its self-possession has all the power over itself. It (Volition) is the true content, the Soul of the self-possessing entity. Volition enters in possession of its content on its own, preserves itself in its content and has itself in it. This is a new definition of the Soul. We determine the Soul through the Will. The Soul is Will. Now we want to see the world in the categories of the Will, of the Good; the Soul is fundamentally in the first instance the Good of the material willing entelechy, which has itself for itself and manifests the power of its Will through its volitions. The task of our time is to explain the world as emanating ultimately from the Will. The Will is rational in itself and in its whole development it becomes rational for itself. The Will itself and nothing but the Will is the total cause of its volitions. Dominating the Soul, The Will has power over all other faculties of the latter so that Hegel's practical reason is not the Will (as Hegel claims) but a moment of the Absolute Rational Will and is moved by it. The Will of the Absolute Material Entelechy is the ultimate source of all being ; it is the self-moving principle of the World. It and it alone is what exists for itself and possesses itself for itself.

In my book I have shown that the principle of the Absolute Rational Will "Will yourself" sublates the principle of cognitive philosophy "Cognise yourself" and (the philosophy of) the Absolute Rational Will sublates (the philosophy of) the Absolute Idea. Hegel's great category SUBLATION is used here in its exact Hegelian meaning - sublation is the the inescapable fate of each philosophy. The Philosophy of Absolute Rational Will expresses the unity of voluntarism and intellectualism; it aims at influencing the development of the Science of Philosophy and establishing a modern voluntarist

movement. The aim of the school is to collect together people interested in the Absolute Rational Will and to promote collaborative research related to a modern voluntarist philosophy. The philosophy of the Absolute Rational Will is to be developed in a systematic way in order to make it a powerful philosophical system, which not only is the necessary and immanent development of the Science of Philosophy, but also is capable of becoming the cornerstone of the philosophy of the new millennium and modern philosophy as such.

In the objective world of nature we need not look for Reason only (as Hegel does), but first and foremost for the Material Rational Will of the Absolute. The aim is once again - as Aristotle did more than 2300 years ago and it is absolutely worth following his example, - to grasp the empirical in its synthesis, to bear in mind all its manifestations (i.e. the industry, politics) and to unite them in their synthesis. The task of our time is to comprehend the Absolute as Rational Will. The history of philosophy and the actual development of the World Will are to be re-written from the standpoint of the Absolute Rational Will, which Hegel's History of Philosophy apparently failed to achieve and, in so doing, neglected a considerable number of philosophers who dealt with the World Will. The time has come; we have understood Hegel's philosophy and we are to develop the Science of Philosophy. But Philosophy in the XXI century is not going to be what it used to be. It is to be revolutionised and philosophy needs nothing less than a successful Copernican revolution. It is true that conservative people are afraid of revolutions, but the fact remains that the future does not belong to those people and never has it belonged to them.

