

Janko Stojanow

ON THE ABSOLUTE RATIONAL WILL

(SUBLATION OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY)

III. On Aristotle's concept of Will

It is hardly surprising that examining Aristotle's work *On the soul*, Hegel does not reach to chapters nine and ten of the third book at all; it is not without good reasons. His Absolute Idea is the thinking itself Idea; thus the latter is self-knowing truth - the absolute and consummate truth. His philosophy is only searching for the true and remains in the circle of the true. Even when he examines the practical, the good, his categories do not go beyond those ones, which he continually uses in his speculative logic. Hegel says that the Aristotelian thought of thought is the highest apex of Aristotle's philosophy and the highest we can cognise. In Aristotle's philosophy, however, the thought which thinks itself, is not yet the principle of his whole philosophy. Aristotle has all the freedom in the world to continue his examination of the Absolute. He goes beyond the idea of the thought of thought.

Let us follow Aristotle; Hegel does not do that. I would like to quote Aristotle's remarks in full for his ideas about the Will have never been examined thoroughly. At the beginning of chapter nine of the third book Aristotle says: "The soul in living creatures is distinguished by two functions, the judging capacity which is a function of the intellect and of sensation combined, and the capacity for exciting movement in space."¹ Considering that he has already discussed the perception and the thinking at a

considerable length in the previous chapter, now Aristotle asks the extremely important question: "What is it that makes the living creature move in space?"² And he starts searching for the answer of this remarkable question. He says: "These two things then, appetite and mind, are clearly capable of causing movement. ...Both of these, then, mind and appetite are productive of movement in space. But the mind in question is that which makes its calculations with an end in view, that is, the practical mind: it differs from the speculative mind in the end that it pursues. And every appetite is directed towards an end; for the thing at which appetite aims is the starting point of the practical mind, and the last step of the practical mind is the beginning of the action. So these two, appetite and practical thought, seem reasonably considered as the producers of movement; for the object of appetite produces movement, and therefore thought produces movement, because the object of appetite is its beginning. Imagination," which Aristotle comprehends as a kind of thinking, "too, when it starts movement, never does so without appetite. That which moves, then, is a single faculty, that of appetite. If there were two movers, mind as well as appetite, they would produce movement in virtue of a common characteristic. But, as things are, mind is never seen to produce movement without appetite (for will is a form of appetite, and when movement accords with calculation, it accords also with choice), but appetite produces movement contrary to calculation; for desire is a form of appetite."³ Aristotle is interested in the Will; he wants to examine it. Hegel makes no mention of that fact.

As a matter of fact, Aristotle does not aim at developing the science of philosophy by virtue of the principle "Cognise yourself" as Hegel does; he goes beyond it for he wants to examine the Will on its own account. He thinks that Volition - the irrational part of the soul, - is the principle of movement. It is a great definition; Aristotle does not need Hegel's concept. The Volition is a manifestation of what is moving itself in and through itself, i.e. a manifestation of the Absolute material entelechy. The latter manifests itself in and through material Volitions as it and it alone and nothing else except it or beyond it is and can be the self-moving principle and beginning of the world.

As we will see below Aristotle's examining of the Will in *On the soul* as well as in his ethical works *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Magna Moralia* and *Eudemian Ethics* is speculative and empirical. The defect of his examination is that he does not yet pose the question: "What is the principle of Will?" We have already answered this question in chapter I "Sublation of Hegel's philosophy. The principle of Will is "Will yourself". It is the principle in virtue of which we want to examine Aristotle's ideas. We say that Willing, Volition, the Will is the hegemonic and governing principle of the Universe. Its "I will" expresses itself not as the subjective urge of the individual (everyone is an individual), but as an objective, directed towards itself and entering in possession of itself activity, i.e. as a self-purpose of the absolute material entelechy, which is actual in and through itself.

The Absolute material entelechy acts and it is precisely its acting in which it has itself, is in possession of itself, and there is nothing in which it does not come into possession of itself. It is the absolute creator, which sets itself purposes - different material forms, the plant and animal kingdoms, man, - and materializes them in and through itself. In each of them the absolute expresses its inner Volition, urge and inclination to possess itself as objective material actuality. It is the purpose, which wills itself and as directed towards itself material actuality has the urge to enter in possession of itself.

It is precisely this being in possession of itself of the absolute material entelechy that is the good of every organic whole; its Volition is the actual material Good. Aristotle does not speak so; he expresses it in his own way. He says: "But movement involves three factors: first the moving cause, secondly the means by which it produces movement, and thirdly the thing moved. The moving cause is of two kinds; one is unmoved and the other both moves and is moved." What moves and what is moved are one and the same; the ultimate end is the beginning of the action. It is the willing itself volition of the absolute material entelechy, which is the in-and-for-itself having itself absolute. "The former is the practical good, while that which both moves and is moved is the appetite (for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement), and the thing moved

is the animal.”⁴ Aristotle claims that the living being moves only insofar as it is in possession of the faculty for wishing. This is a great and superb definition; it appears for the first time in the history of philosophy.

However, Aristotle fails to bring forward the principle. He does not say that the practical Good is the Volition of the absolute, that the latter is Volition; it is not yet the principle of his philosophy. But he does say that in itself the wish of the living being is precisely the practical Good, which wishes nothing else but itself alone. The end and the beginning unite; in the final end the beginning of the energy of the absolute material entelechy meets only with itself. It is a great merit of the Aristotelian philosophy that it determines the absolute final end - the practical Good, the Volition, - as immanent possession of the material actuality. The practical Good is the Volition of itself; it is not formed from outside. Aristotle claims, “that if nature is activity for a certain end, or if it is the implicitly universal, “it is absurd to deny that action is in conformity with end, because that which moves cannot be seen to have deliberated and considered.””⁵ This purpose is objective. Aristotle defines the practical Good as unmoved, i.e. as the in-and-for itself having itself material actuality. The latter has in itself the Volition to wish, to want itself. The wish of the living being is nothing else but the acting, the activity of the absolute Volition. The wishing (the subjective) and what is wished (the objective) is one and the same; the material entelechy is the actual by means of itself. It wills itself and for itself. And, precisely thus, it is the absolute possession of itself.

Here a new moment emerges in philosophy, which Hegel completely fails to notice or rather keeps silent about. Although he asserts that “if we would be serious with Philosophy, nothing would be more desirable than to lecture upon Aristotle, for he is of all the ancients the most deserving of study,”⁶ Hegel, who gives Plato's *Republic* so many pages of print in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, gives Aristotle's ethical works and his *Politics* just a few pages. It cannot be an act of pure accident. Hegel must have had good reasons not to do that. He arrives at Aristotle's thought of thought, he proclaims the latter to be the highest summit of Aristotle's philosophy and the most speculative that can exist; he approves all Aristotle's

ideas which are in harmony with the principle "Cognise yourself", but when Aristotle goes beyond the bounds of this principle, Hegel does not want to and cannot follow him. Notwithstanding his fearless will to scientific cognition of truth, he abides by himself and his principle "Cognise yourself". However, "Cognise yourself" does not constitute the totality of the truly higher principle of the absolute, and consequently, it cannot express the whole infinite wealth of the latter.

We, however, want to follow Aristotle. Therefore, here we abandon the road, which Hegel chose more than 2400 years after Aristotle, and return to the one, which Aristotle examined superbly. He says that the thinking and the Willing (objective Volition) are the two different moments of the absolute material entelechy. The latter divides into these two absolute opposites. Thus, it gives rise to its infinite contradiction in and through itself; it is as much the one as the other and in each of them it is precisely at home with itself. It sublates the contradiction, unites the opposites and thanks to itself, it cognises itself and comes to possession of itself in its own unity. In all epochs people have striven to cognise the world, to take it in possession and to have it as their property. This is the determinate way in which the entelechy attains its absolute purpose: "Will yourself." It is the absolute principle, which has these two moments in itself: on the one hand the purpose, the practical good, the irrational part of the soul, the Volition and its absolute commandment "Will yourself", and on the other hand, the thinking itself thought and its principle "Cognise yourself." However, the material entelechy unites them in the infinite power and flexibility of its unity so that Will is superior to the thinking itself thought and contains the latter as a moment. Thus, in virtue of its highest principle "Will yourself" the Absolute rules its own deed - the world.

Aristotle certainly does not speak so, He does not yet pose the question "Which is the highest principle of the absolute entelechy?" and he does not search for the answer of this question. But he vigorously points out that Volition is a higher moment in comparison with thought, practical Reason. It is the acting material actuality, which definitely needs the thought (it thinks itself), but only as a moment of its universal insuperable power. The thinking

gives itself up to the power of Volition, reconciles with the absolute power of its own creator - the material entelechy, which thus, is at home with itself and has itself as the freest.

Now this is to be examined in detail. As we have seen above, Aristotle asserts that practical Reason (let alone theoretical Reason) is not the moving, that the subject of Reason is the objective self-moving absolute beginning, the material entelechy. Reason cognises its objects, but even as a practical Reason it cannot be the cause for their origin or movement. Aristotle expresses the strongest conviction that "mind is never seen to produce movement without appetite (for will is a form of appetite, and when movement accords with calculation, it accords also with choice), but appetite produces movement contrary to calculation; for desire is a form of appetite."⁷ He expresses the same thought in his *Nicomachean Ethics* where he asserts: "It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical, for it is this that rules productive thought also; for he who produces does so for the sake of something, [a product], though a product is not an end without qualification but is relative to something else and is a qualified end."⁸ The purpose, the Volition as the striving for itself and in-and-for-itself having itself practical Good, is the first. It is the absolute form of the material entelechy. The Volition, the urge, is the subject's energy, which does not give him peace and makes him move, overcome all difficulties and achieve his goals.

This is the beginning of the philosophical revolution, which Aristotle began and which has not yet been completed, the reason being that the thinking was excessively preoccupied with itself and its own determinations. Aristotle was the first philosopher in the history of philosophy to say that the Will serves as basis of the ethics, the politics, the whole human practice. He was the first to point out the volitional nature of the absolute material entelechy, which takes possession of itself in and through its own volition. Thus the Reason, the true, the Spirit, which Socrates, Plato and Hegel proclaim to be the highest and the most powerful and which dominates and subordinates to itself everything else, is actually subordinate to the practical

Good and its Volition. This is the great turning point of the world Rational Will. Cognition, Reason and Spirit are only moments of the taking possession of itself absolute Volition.

It is precisely by virtue of that turning point of the world Rational Will that Aristotle criticizes Socrates and Plato. At the very beginning of his *Magna Moralia* after criticizing Pythagoras, who “was the first who undertook to speak of virtue, but his method is erroneous. In referring virtue to numerical relations, he considered it from an inappropriate point of view,”⁹ he goes on saying that “After him came Socrates, who dealt more fully and satisfactorily with the matter, still even he did not escape error. For he regarded the Virtues as mere departments of science; which they cannot possibly be. All departments of science presuppose a rational principle or Standard; and this is the product of the soul’s intellectual part. According therefore to Socrates, all the virtues arise in the reasoning part of the soul; from which it follows that in making the virtues departments of science he ignores our irrational part, and thus ignores both passion and the moral character. Clearly then this was not the right way to deal with the virtues.”¹⁰ This is superb; Aristotle is the philosopher, who began this world-historical revolution. Aristotle sees clearly that Socrates as well as Plato, who followed the latter, abstract from the wishes, the desires, the passions of the willing subject. It is beyond doubt that thought strives to determine the concept of Will; it cognises the Volition, which continuously materializes its own aim. But Aristotle points out the subjective individual Will, the principle of individuation and self-possession of the acting material entelechy, which is subordinate to its own law.

The abstract Plato's idea lacks in entelechy. Plato does not take the latter into consideration at all, he does not arrive at it and for this reason his ideas are essentially the mere general, which is devoid of the actuality and individuality of the willing subject and its concrete individual acting, in and through which the material entelechy takes possession of itself. These are Aristotle's remarks about Plato: “The next step was taken by Plato, who rightly divided the soul into a rational and an irrational part, and assigned to each its befitting virtues or excellences. So far, he was right; but after this, he fell into

error. For he confused the treatment of Virtue with that of Ideal Good. This was wrong, because inappropriate. The subject of (moral) Virtue should have been excluded from the discussion of Being and Truth; for the two subjects have nothing in common.”¹¹ The defect of Plato's philosophy is that it regards the absolute as ideal, as the abstract universal, but cannot apprehend the absolute in its material entelechiality as having in itself the principle of the acting individuality. According to him “the body and what relates to the body is a hindrance in striving after wisdom, the sole business of Philosophy, because the sensuous perception shows nothing purely, or as it is in itself, and what is true becomes known through the removal of the spiritual from the corporeal. For justice, beauty and such things are what alone exists in verity; they are that to which all change and decay is foreign; and these are not perceived through the body, but only in the soul.”¹²

Plato does not take into consideration the subjective Volition of the individual; he does not unite the latter with his idea because - as Hegel says, - in the individual he regards only the universal and proclaims the latter to be the true. Plato discovered the intellectual world, in which the majority of the philosophers, who lived after him, as well as the Christian theologians and Hegel, felt superbly; it was Hegel who attained to the Absolute Idea as self-knowing truth. It is true - as Hegel asserts, - that Plato's idea is objective; it is not transcendental. It is the genus, the universal. But the fact remains that Plato does not yet acknowledge the principle of individual subjective Volition of the independent individuality to be a moment of the absolute. That is why his idea is only the lifeless universal, in virtue of which Plato developed the intellectual ethics of Socrates.

Aristotle, however, is a thinking empiricist. Hegel appreciates that; it was he who called Aristotle a thinking empiricist. The abstract Plato's idea does not satisfy Aristotle. Not only was he the first to grasp that the mind ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) is the thought of thought, but he also regarded the absolute, the world, in its material entelechiality; Hegel acknowledges only Aristotle's thought of thought. But the material entelechy is the most actual; it has the principle “Will yourself”, - the objective principle of Volition of free individuality, - as its

absolute principle. It is precisely by virtue of the principle of Volition that the material entelechy takes possession of itself and in the living being, in man, it has and uses its own nature. The welfare of the living being, its self-preserving, is its own deed. The living being has the need, the urge to be in possession of both itself and the surrounding entelechial world; the latter is its own world as there is nothing that is not entelechial and created by the material entelechy.

Volition is the source of the natural needs, urges, impulses, instincts and drives of the living being; the latter has the whole energy of its volition to satisfy them. Living beings and man strive for their practical (actual) good; the material entelechy cannot wish anything else but itself, its own Volition. For that reason Aristotle says: "Now if of things we do there is an end which we wish for its own sake whereas the other things we wish for the sake of this end, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for in this manner the process will go on to infinity and our desire will be empty and vain), then clearly this end would be the good and the highest good."¹³ He determines the latter further: "Again, among ends themselves the complete is always better than the incomplete. A complete good is one the presence of which leaves us in need of nothing; an incomplete good is one which may be present while yet we need something further; for instance, we may have justice and yet need many things besides, but when we have happiness we need nothing more. This then is the best thing of which we are in search, which is the complete end. The complete end then is the good and end of goods."¹⁴

According to Aristotle happiness is the final end and the supreme good of the Volition of material entelechy; it is the purpose of man's Will. Let us quote Hegel; his translation is definitely the most speculative one: "Aristotle says that the good is what has its end in itself (τελειον). If we tried to translate τελειον by "perfect" here, we should translate it badly; it is that which, as having its end (το τελος) in itself, is not desired for the sake of anything else, but for its own sake. Aristotle determines happiness in this regard as the absolute end existing in and for itself, and gives the following definition of it: It

is ‘the energy of the life that has its end in itself in accordance with absolute virtue.’”) in itself, is not desired for the sake of anything else, but for its own sake. Aristotle determines happiness in this regard as the absolute end existing in and for itself, and gives the following definition of it: It is ‘the energy of the life that has its end in itself in accordance with absolute virtue.’”) in itself, is not desired for the sake of anything else, but for its own sake. Aristotle determines happiness in this regard as the absolute end existing in and for itself, and gives the following definition of it: It is ‘the energy of the life that has its end in itself in accordance with absolute virtue.’”) in itself, is not desired for the sake of anything else, but for its own sake. Aristotle determines happiness in this regard as the absolute end existing in and for itself, and gives the following definition of it: It is ‘the energy of the life that has its end in itself in accordance with absolute virtue.’”¹⁵ Man, the highest self-organisation of the principle “Will yourself”, attains his happiness through active using of his entelechial nature. Aristotle asserts that the natural impulses and urges of man, his needs and his selfishness serve as a basis of ethics, politics and any practical activity, in and through which man manifests his absolute self-moving entelechial Volition. And precisely this is the infinite merit of Aristotle's philosophy: he was the first to regard man as absolute actual subjectivity due to the fact that he regarded man in his infinite material entelechiality.

So far I have not spoken about the thought of thought, about the conscious choice of Rational Will only because I wanted to point out Aristotle's material entelechiality in contrast to Plato and Hegel's pure objective idealism. At this point it is time for us to start discussing Aristotle's ethical works. True, Hegel acknowledges: “Just as the best that we even now possess in reference to psychology is what we have obtained from Aristotle, so is it with his reflections on the actual agent in volition, on freedom, and the further determinations of imputation, intention, etc.”¹⁶ However, the fact remains that he fails to hold Aristotle's ethics in great esteem. He concludes: “Aristotle goes on to say much that is good and beautiful about virtue and the good and happiness in general, and states that happiness, as the good attainable by us, is not to be found without virtue, etc; in all of which there is no profound

insight from a speculative point of view.”¹⁷ But in fact it is precisely his ethical works where Aristotle is most speculative and attains the highest speculation by and large. As will be argued below, this speculation goes excessively far; it goes beyond Hegel's favorite principle “Cognise yourself”. Hegel could not follow him; he preferred to abide by himself.

It is, however, for us to abide by the true and the speculative, which have their beginning in Aristotle's philosophy. At the time the thinking was gathering strength; it still was not developed enough so as to point out the principle clearly; we cannot want Aristotle to have done that. Thus Aristotle could not develop the true and the speculative in accord with the severe discipline of the principle. He states that in spite of the fact that Volition is an immanent movement of all other living beings, free choice is not; the latter needs Rational Will as well. But what Aristotle says about Reason is contradictory. On the one hand, he claims that the theory, the theoretical life, is the supreme Good and the perfect happiness: “This [contemplative] activity is the highest of all since the intellect (a) is the best of the parts in us and (b) is concerned with the best of the known objects. It is the most continuous of our activities; for (a) we are more able to be engaged continuously in theoretical activity than to perform any action continuously and (b) we think that pleasure should be intermingled with happiness; and it is agreed that the most pleasant of our virtuous activities is the one in accordance with wisdom”¹⁸ Aristotle points out the great role of Reason: “And what was stated earlier is appropriate here also: that which is by nature proper to each thing is the best and most pleasant for that thing. So for a man, too, the life according to his intellect is the best and most pleasant, if indeed a man in the highest sense is his intellect. Hence this life, too, is the happiest.”¹⁹ Here we see Aristotle expressing the greatest praise of the intellect and the thought of thought.

But at the same time he knows extremely well that in itself thought is defective. Hence, on the other hand he points out the active entelechial nature of happiness. By and large the pure being in possession of knowledge, - cognition for the sake of cognition, - is not an end in itself for the individual.

The moment of the entelechial material acting is the most important one to the philosopher of absolute material entelechy: “None of the other kinds of knowledge imparts to him who learns it the power to use and act upon it; but only the possession of it. No more in the present case does the knowledge of these things impart the power to use them – for happiness we define as an Activity – but only their possession; and Happiness does not consist in the knowledge of its components, but comes by making use of them. But the use of these things, and how to act upon them, it is not the task of our present treatise to impart; for indeed no other branch of knowledge imparts the use but only the possession of itself.”²⁰ The task of thought is to regard Volition in its concrete material entelechy. Aristotle vigorously asserts that the Reason, the Spirit, in itself is not a principle of the virtue; the latter is a manifestation of entelechial Volition: “And we may state without any qualification that, contrary to the opinion of other (moralists), it is not Rational Principle which originally points the way to Virtue, but rather the passions. For first of all, there must arise (as we know there actually does) an unreasoning impulse towards what is noble and good; afterwards, Principle must give its vote and verdict (on the suggested act). This is seen in the case of children and other unreasoning beings. In them there arise at first unreasoning impulses of the passions towards noble aims; not till afterwards does Principle supervene, and by its approving vote bring about the performance of noble actions. On the other hand where Principle originally points to noble ends, the passions by no means (always) follow with their assent; often they oppose it. Wherefore passion, if in right condition, has more claim than Principle to be the original motive force which inclines us to Virtue.”²¹ Thus we see Aristotle to point out the great moment that Reason can take possession of the Volition (its aspirations, longings, desires and passions), but only if it submits itself to volition. The purpose of any cognition, studying, science, is to cognise the acting, to come into possession of it, but only to serve it.

We have already quoted Aristotle, who argues that the mere thought does not set anything in motion; only a thought having a purpose does: “Also, a wish is of the end rather than of the means, while intention is of the means relative to the end; e.g., we wish to be healthy but we choose after

deliberation the means through which we may become healthy, and we wish to be happy and speak of this, but it does not befit us to say that we choose after deliberation to be happy, and in general, intention seems to be concerned with things which can be brought about by us.”²² Thought includes in itself the urge, the Volition; it premises the latter as a moving cause, as the absolutely actual. Aristotle grasped that it is not the purpose that is a subject of decision of the conscious choice, but only the means of achieving the purpose. Hence “purposive choice deals not with the End but with those goods which are means thereto, are within our power to compass, and present alternatives for our choice. It follows that we must, before determining, submit them to our Intelligence and its deliberation. Then when Intelligence has decided that one is better than the other, there follows an impulse to act in this way; and in so acting, it seems that we act with purposive Choice.”²³ The material entelechy has the thought as an absolutely necessary moment of its highest principle; Aristotle does not yet formulate the principle. But he is aware that without thought the irrational part of the soul, the Volition, manifests itself only in the form of aspiration, instinct, appetite, impulse or urge to attain its goal, its supreme good - the practical Good. Therefore, only thanks to the thought the entelechy takes possession of itself as conscious willing.

While it is true that Aristotle is not aware of the principle yet - he failed to express explicitly the ultimate, the first self-moving principle of the Absolute, - the fact remains that he attains the absolute unity of the volitional (irrational) part of the soul and its rational part. He arrives at the standpoint that in virtue of their entelechiality these two different parts are perfectly identical: “It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical, for it is this that rules productive thought also; for he who produces does so for the sake of something, [a product], though a product is not an end without qualification but is relative to something else and is a qualified end. But an object of action [is an end without qualification], for a good action is [such] an end, and this is what we desire. Hence intention is either a desiring intellect or a thinking desire, and such a principle is a man,”²⁴ in other words, man is as much a thought (intellect) moved by Volition (and its

desires) as he is a Volition (desire) moved by thought. Aristotle made the impossible before him possible. What had not yet been known became well known. He united the reason, the concept, the true, in a word, the Spirit and the Volition, i.e. the Volition becomes rational and the Reason becomes willing. This is a great definition; the greatest definition by and large, which ancient Greece gave us. It was a product of outstanding philosophical speculation. Aristotle reaches the absolute unity of the entelechial opposites, unites them in their vital totality; he does not leave them to break up into their abstract forms.

Aristotle understood that the practical Good is the true subject of Volition, which is the objective Will, the Willed. At the same time, however, it is a subject of the conscious choice. And if that willed, "the object of intention is the object which is deliberately desired and which is in our power to attain, intention too would be a deliberate desire of things which are in our power" of will, of willing "to bring about; for having decided on an alternative after deliberation, we desire that alternative in accordance with that deliberation."²⁵ The absolute is a unity of the thought of thought, which attains itself as a self-knowing truth and which Hegel defined as the substance of will and the entelechial Will (Volition), which thinks itself in and through itself in order to come in possession of itself, i.e. the absolute material entelechy is the Will of Will. This is the highest definition of the absolute.

Hegel proclaimed the thought of thought to be the highest standpoint of philosophy saying that "nothing deeper can we desire to know."²⁶ Therefore, Hegel failed to examine the whole wealth of Aristotle's philosophy. He stopped in the middle of the road; he did not succeed in going the whole way. Hegel arrived at the complete development of his principle "Cognise yourself" only.

Aristotle put the beginning of a new, higher principle; however, he did not formulate it clearly. In his philosophy the thought goes deep in the pure "I want" of the absolute volition. The latter is not the particular "I want" of the subjective will of a certain individual, but a totality of its own determinations and laws; the task of thought is to discover them and give them a meaning. Thought is cognition of the Will, of the Volition. Hence, the absolute material

entelechy is the willing itself Will, which thinks itself, or the Will, which is the thought of thought as well. Aristotle examined the Good in its entelechiality as the willing and thinking itself material entelechy. Aristotle does not yet say that the pure individual person is the highest form and the highest development of the principle "Will yourself". He does not yet say so, but without question, he began to develop the supreme principle of the Absolute, which due to its immanent infinite creative energy develops itself in and through itself and in its deeds unites with itself only.

NOTES

1. Aristotle, *On the soul*, with an English translation by W.S. Hett, London, WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD / Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 181

2. *Ibidem*, page 183

3. Aristotle, *On the soul*, with an English translation by W.S. Hett, London, WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD / Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 187- 189

4. *Ibidem*, page 191

5. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, volume 2, *Plato and the Platonists*, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, pp. 161-162

6. *Ibidem*, page 134

7. Aristotle, *On the soul*, with an English translation by W.S. Hett, London, WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD / Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 187- 189

8. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht - Holland/ Boston – U.S.A., 1975, p. 102

9. Aristotle, *Oeconomica and Magna Moralia*, with an English translation by G. Cyril Armstrong, London: William Heinemann LTD / Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 449

10. *Ibidem*, pp. 449-451

11. *Ibidem*, page 451

12. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, volume 2, Plato and the Platonists, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, pp. 41-42

13. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht - Holland/ Boston – U.S.A., 1975, p. 1

14. The complete works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes, volume 2, Magna Moralia, translated by St. George Stock, published by Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 1872

15. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, volume 2, Plato and the Platonists, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, pp. 203-204

16. Ibidem, page 203

17. Ibidem, page 204

18. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht - Holland/ Boston – U.S.A., 1975, p. 193

19. Ibidem, pp.194-195

20. Aristotle, Oeconomica and Magna Moralia, with an English translation by G. Cyril Armstrong, London: William Heinemann LTD / Harvard University Press, p. 647

21. Ibidem, p.635

22. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht - Holland/ Boston – U.S.A., 1975, p. 39

23. Aristotle, *Oeconomica* and *Magna Moralia*, with an English translation by G. Cyril Armstrong, London: William Heinemann LTD / Harvard University Press, p.503

24. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht - Holland/ Boston – U.S.A., 1975, p. 102

25. *Ibidem*, page 42

26. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, volume 2, *Plato and the Platonists*, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1995, page 150